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BASLE COMMITTEE MINIMUM STANDARDS:
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY RESPONSE
TO THE FAILURE OF BCCI
DUNCAN E. ALFORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The coordinated closure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (BCCI) onJuly 5, 1991 in nations around the world
rocked financial circles. The failure of the $20 billion bank was
one of the largest in international banking history. Unfortu-
nately, the failure of BCCI was the latest in a series of bank fail-
ures, including those of the Herstatt Bank in Germany in 1974
and Banco Ambrosiano in Luxembourg in 1982. International
banking regulators, through the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision,' responded to each of these earlier failures by issu-
ing more stringent guidelines for international bank regulation. 2
One year after the closure of BCCI and in response to weak-
nesses in the international financial system, the Basle Committee
issued new minimum standards for international banking super-
vision, its third formulation of these guidelines.3
This Article first traces the development of the international
agreements on bank supervision reached by the Basle Committee
since its inception in 1975: the Concordat of 1975 and the
* Associate, Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A. 1985, University of Vir-
ginia;J.D. 1991, University of North Carolina. Member of the Georgia and North Caro-
lina State Bars.
1. The Basle Committee is made up of banking regulators from twelve nations:
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is named after its usual
meeting place-Basle, Switzerland. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), also
based in Basle, provides staff support for the Committee's activities. JJ. Norton, The
Work of the Basle Supervisors Committee on Bank Capital Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on
"International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards ", 23 INT'L LAw. 245,
247- 48 (1989). See generally James V. Hackney & Kim L. Shafer, The Regulation of Interna-
tional Banking: An Assessment of International Institutions, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
475, 488-89 (1986); Norton, supra, at 247-55.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 32-117.
3. BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE
SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING GROUPS AND THEIR CROss-BORDER ESTABLISH-
MENTS (June 1992) (on file with The George Washington Journal of International Law and Eco-
nomics) [hereinafter MINIMUM STANDARDS].
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Revised Concordat of 1983. 4 Against the background of the
BCCI failure, the Article then analyzes the Minimum Standards
issued by the Basle Committee in July 1992-the Committee's
latest attempt to improve international banking regulation. 5
Next, there is an examination of legislation enacted by the U.S.
Congress to tighten foreign bank supervision, known as the For-
eign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA);6 and of
efforts within the European Community to set minimum bank
supervisory standards in preparation for implementation of the
Europe 1992 program. 7 The Article also highlights additional
proposals for changes intended to tighten international bank
supervision. 8 Finally, the Article analyzes the weaknesses of the
Minimum Standards (and other proposals for reform) and con-
cludes that rather than being a leap forward, the Minimum Stan-
dards reinforce past agreements and represent the latest stage in
a series of incremental agreements on international banking
regulation .9
II. BACKGROUND: U.S. REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS
The globalization of capital markets presents new challenges
to bank regulators. Increased world trade, greater economic
growth in foreign nations, relaxed government restrictions on
capital outflows, and technological advances, particularly in com-
munications, have allowed capital markets to become truly
global.' 0 Additionally, advances in technology and transporta-
tion have decreased banks' costs of doing business, thus increas-
ing the potential market banks can serve."1
4. See infra text accompanying notes 32-117.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 180-226.
6. Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, secs.
201-215, 105 Stat. 2286, 2286-305 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3111 (1988 & Supp.
III 1992)) [hereinafter FBSEA]. See infra text accompanying notes 261-277.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 229-260. The main focus will be on Council
Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consoli-
dated Basis, 1992 Oj. (L 110) 52.
Europe 1992 is the program to create a free trade zone among the twelve member
states of the European Community. See Alan Riding, As Leaders Stand at Door to Future,
Europe Puzzles over What's Beyond, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at A12.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 278-322.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 208-260 and 323-338.
10. Patricia S. Skigen, Globalization of Banking: Foreign Banking in the United States, in 1
SEVENTH ANNUAL FINANCIAL SERVICES INSTITUTE 275, 279-80 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 639, 1989).
11. H. Robert Heller, International Economic Challenges to American Banking, 9 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 323, 323 (1990).
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In the United States, foreign banks have attained a greater
share of the financial services market in recent years. In 1978,
122 foreign banks had $90 billion in assets in the United States.
By 1991, 294 foreign banks, with over 700 offices, had assets of
$800 billion-nearly 25% of the total amount of bank lending in
the United States. 12 While banks have become more interna-
tional, however, the international system of bank regulation has
not kept pace. Furthermore, the amount of cooperation among
bank regulators in different nations has not matched the develop-
ment of international banking markets.
For instance, the regulation of foreign banks in the United
States is very complex.' 3 Although the Basle Committee has
made significant efforts to develop a common approach to inter-
national banking regulation, there is no true international bank-
ing law. Domestic laws and regulations govern the international
activities of banks. Until passage of the FBSEA, 14 the Interna-
tional Banking Act (IBA)' 5 was the primary statute governing the
regulation of foreign banks operating in the United States.
Under the IBA, a foreign bank in the United States could
receive approval to operate from either federal or state banking
regulators.16 A foreign bank operating in the United States could
choose among several different types of entities in setting up its
U.S. operations: an agency, a representative office, a branch, a
subsidiary or an Edge Act corporation. 17 An agency can make
12. S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 113-14 (1991). Most of the foreign bank
lending in the United States is done through branches and agencies of the parent. The
vast majority of these branches and agencies-94% in 1990-are licensed by the states
rather than the federal government. Id. at 114.
13. See P. Nicholas Kourides, United States Bank Regulation of International Banking
Activities, in INSTITUTE OF BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 1989 301, 376 (Practising Law
Institute ed., 1989).
14. FBSEA, supra note 6.
15. International Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988), as amended
by FBSEA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3111 (Supp. III 1992).
16. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 12, at 114. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 3101(5), (6) (1988 &
Supp. III 1992) (defining "Federal agency" and "Federal branch" as entities organized
pursuant to federal law) with id. § 3101(11), (12) (defining "State agency" and "State
branch" as entities organized pursuant to state law). See also Kourides, supra note 13, at
376. With the passage of the FBSEA, the regulatory burden on foreign banks operating
in the United States will probably increase because the Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
will regulate all foreign banks even if they operate in the United States under a state
charter. See infra text accompanying notes 26-31 and 263-277.
17. Kourides, supra note 13, at 377-80. Edge Act corporations engage exclusively in
international banking activity in the United States and are designed to further foreign
trade. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-61 la (1988). The FRB regulates Edge Act corporations. Id.
§ 61 Ia. See generally M.A. Nunes, Foreign Banks Come Sailing in as United States Banks Tack
1992]
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. [Vol. 26
loans to customers, but cannot accept deposits,' 8 and may be
licensed by the federal government or a state government.' 9 A
representative office generally performs public relations func-
tions for the foreign bank and merely acts as a "contact point"
for the bank's local customers.20 Under the IBA, a foreign bank
was required to register a representative office with the Depart-
ment of the Treasury. 2
1
A branch can make loans and take deposits22 and, as with an
agency, can be licensed-by the federal government or a state gov-
ernment.2 3 Most foreign banks when operating abroad use the
branch or agency entity and do not incorporate in each nation.
24
By using the branch form, all the assets of the parent bank are
available to support the operations of the foreign branch.2 5 In
contrast, a subsidiary, because it is a separate legal entity from its
parent company, cannot rely on the parent for financial support.
Federal or state agencies may license subsidiaries of foreign
banks.2 6 The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) regulates foreign
Slowly Upwind, 13 Hous.J. INT'L L. 39 (1990) (discussing U.S. establishment options and
the U.S. regulation of foreign bank establishments).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 3101(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1992); see also id. § 3102(d) (exempting
Federal agencies from certain prohibited functions).
19. See id. § 3101(5), (11) (defining "Federal agency" and "State agency"); see also
Nunes, supra note 17, at 49.
20. Nunes, supra note 17, at 55.
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 3107(a) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 3107 (Supp. III 1992)
(requiring stricter federal approval and regulation of representative offices); see also
Nunes, supra note 17, at 55 (discussing history of representative offices).
22. See 12 U.S.C. § 3101(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1992) (stating that a branch is an
establishment of a foreign bank in the United States "at which deposits are received");
id. § 3102(b) (granting foreign branches the power to conduct operations "with the
same rights and privileges as a national bank").
23. See id. § 3101(6), (.12) (defining "Federal branch" and "State branch").
24. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 12, at 114; Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 741
(1989).
25. See Steven L. Wolfram & Michael L. Whitener, US Tug of War Over Foreign Banks,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., May 1992, at 20, 24.
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 3101(13) (1988 & Supp. III 1992) (assigning the term "subsidi-
ary" the same meaning as used in 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(d) (1988); the term, in turn, is used
in 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1988), which states that federal regulation of bank holding compa-
nies shall not be "construed as preventing any State from exercising such powers and
jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to . . . subsidiaries");
accord Charles W. Hultman, U.S. International Bank Supervision & the Revised Basle Concordat,
BANK ADMIN., Feb. 1985, at 76, 78. Determination of which agency regulates the subsid-
iary depends on whether the subsidiary bank is a member of the Federal Reserve System
or not. Cf id. at 78. See also PeterJ. Lewarne, A Practical Assessment of Some of the Problems
Encountered by Foreign Banks Carrying On Business in the United States, in INSTITUTE OF BANK-
ING LAW AND REGULATION 1990 451, 466, 471-72 (Practising Law Institute ed., 1990)
(discussing state licensing of foreign bank subsidiaries).
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bank holding companies. 27
When Congress passed the IBA in 1978, it adopted the princi-
ple of national treatment for foreign banks.2 8 According to this
principle, foreign banks in the United States are "entitled to the
same powers and subjected to the same restrictions as similarly
situated [U.S.-based] banks." 29 Reciprocal national treatment
was not part of this policy-the IBA did not make the entry of
foreign banks into the United States contingent on how U.S.
banks were treated when operating in a particular foreign coun-
try.30 The FBSEA appears to have rejected the IBA's idea of
national treatment. Under the FBSEA, foreign banks and U.S.
banks are regulated differently even though they are operating in
the same markets.3 ' A foreign bank must receive FRB approval
to operate even if it is operating under a state charter, while a
state-chartered bank headquartered in the United States need
not receive FRB approval.
III. THE BASLE COMMITrEE
A. Development
As in other nations, U.S. regulation of foreign banks is focused
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1988) (defining "bank holding company" broadly);
accord Hultman, supra note 26, at 78. But see 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(A) (excepting from
FRB regulation those foreign bank holding companies that would be subject to such
regulation solely by virtue of their control of a bank that has "an insured or uninsured
branch in the United States"). U.S. banking agencies regulate the overseas operations
of U.S. banks. See generally Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 et seq. (1988); Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1988 & Supp. III 1992); Inter-
national Banking Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1988 & Supp. III 1992). Regu-
lation K of the Federal Reserve Board requires U.S. banks to provide information to
regulators on their overseas activities. 12 C.F.R. § 211 (1992) (setting forth require-
ments for Federal Reserve Board regulation of the international operations of U.S.
banks); see Hultman, supra note 26, at 79.
28. Lewarne, supra note 26, at 465; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3103 (1988).
29. Heller, supra note 11, at 327; see Lewarne, supra note 26, at 465.
30. Heller, supra note 11, at 327.
31. The FBSEA significantly amended portions of the IBA. For instance, every for-
eign bank must now receive approval from the FRB before it can open any type of bank-
ing entity in the United States. FBSEA, supra note 6, sec. 202 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3105(d)(1), (2) (Supp. III 1992)) (requiring federal approval before the opening of
"foreign bank offices" in the United States and setting forth standards for approval). In
comparison, U.S. banks still have the option of choosing between a federal or state char-
ter. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B) (1988) (defining "bank" as "[ain institution organ-
ized under the laws of the United States, any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, any territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, or the Virgin
Islands."); accord 12 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1988) (defining the term "State bank"). See infra
notes 261-277 for discussion and analysis of the treatment foreign banks receive under
the FBSEA.
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principally on operations by foreign banks within U.S. borders.
Yet, as capital markets have become global, events in other
nations can have dramatic, and sometimes devastating, effects on
local economies. With the increased globalization of the banking
industry, the systemic risk of a financial crisis has increased; but
banking regulation among nations has not improved congruently
to meet this greater risk. The Basle Committee, through its issu-
ance of minimum standards for bank supervision, is attempting
to rectify this situation.
The collapse of the Herstatt Bank in Germany in 1974 led to
the creation of the Basle Committee and the issuance of the
Committee's first agreement on bank supervision, known as the
Basle Concordat, 32 in 1975. Due to its fraudulent bookkeeping
practices, the Herstatt Bank failed and other German banks were
unable to bail it out.33 Legal claims against the Herstatt Bank
were eventually settled. 34 Most of the international operations of
the bank were conducted at its head office in Germany and,
therefore, mainly domestic assets were involved. 35 Nevertheless,
the resolution of the bank's failure-particularly the incomplete
satisfaction of foreign creditors' claims-set a negative precedent
for the settlement of international financial crises and demon-
strated the need for greater international regulation.3 6
The Basle Committee was organized in 1975 in direct response
to the Herstatt Bank failure of 1974.37 The Committee's mem-
bers consist of banking regulators from eleven major industrial-
32. COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, BASLE CON-
CORDAT ON PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 7, INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS, 1981 29-32
[hereinafter BASLE CONCORDAT]. The original Concordat was not released to the public
until March 1981. Id. at 29.
33. Ulrich Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano Collapse and the Luxury of National Lenders of Last
Resort with International Responsibilities, 22 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 181, 185-86 (1990).
See generally Joseph D. Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J.
1290 (1976) (giving full account of Herstatt failure). In addition, the London branch of
the Franklin National Bank suffered severe losses in the early 1970s, for which the Fed-
eral Reserve compensated with liquidity support. Franklin National Bank eventually
failed anyway, illustrating the confusion of supervisory responsibilities over interna-
tional banks. See Hess, supra, at 186-87.
34. West German banks received 45%, foreign banks received 55%, and other
creditors received 65% of their respective claims. Hess, supra note 33, at 186.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. RICHARD DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 172 (1986); Ethan
B. Kapstein, Revolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regula-
tions, 43 INT'L ORG. 323, 329 (1989); Norton, supra note 1, at 246-47.
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ized nations and Luxembourg.38 The purpose of the Committee
is to provide "regular co-operation between its member coun-
tries on banking supervisory matters."3 9 The Committee hopes
to encourage the convergence of banking regulation to a com-
mon approach through the issuance of guidelines developed by
consensus among its members; thus, it seeks to harmonize the
banking laws of its member nations indirectly. 4° While the Basle
Committee has no legal enforcement power itself, it encourages
member nations to abide by these regulatory guidelines and to
use whatever authority they possess to enact and enforce them.4 1
The Committee has issued several guidelines for international
banking supervision: the Basle Concordat of 1975;42 the Revised
Concordat;43 and the Capital Adequacy Standards.44 The Basle
Concordat and the Revised Concordat are the main focus of this
article.
B. The Basle Concordat of 1975
As a result of the Herstatt failure and the subsequent confu-
sion it caused over the settlement of the bank's liabilities, the
Basle Committee set as its first task the establishment of an
agreement on the respective roles of home country supervisors
to ensure that all international financial institutions are super-
vised.45 The Committee fulfilled this task by issuing the Basle
38. Norton, supra note 1, at 248 n. 18; see also Joseph J. Norton, The Multidimensions of
the Convergence Processes Regarding the Prudential Supervision of International Banking Activi-
ties-the Impact of the Basle Supervisors Committee's Efforts Upon, Within and Without the Euro-
pean Community, in FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF SIR JOSEPH GOLD 249, 259-61 (Werner F.
Ebke &JosephJ. Norton eds., 1990). See generally Marilyn B. Cane & David A. Barclay,
Competitive Inequality: American Banking in the International Arena, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 273, 319 n.321 (1990) (providing background on the BIS and the Basle Commit-
tee); Hackney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 488-89 (same).
39. Peter Cooke, The Basle "Concordat" on Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments,
39 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 151, 151 (1984).
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. BASLE CONCORDAT, supra note 32.
43. COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, REVISED
BASLE CONCORDAT ON PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISH-
MENTS, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 901 (1983) [hereinafter REVISED CONCORDAT] (on file with
The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
44. COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS, reprinted in 51
Banking Rep. (BNA) 143 (July 25, 1988) [hereinafter CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS].
See generally Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy Standards: Anal-
ysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK.J. INT'L L. 189 (1992) (analyzing the
Capital Adequacy Standards and their impact on the banking industry).
45. See Richard Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1991, at 12.
19921
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Concordat,46 a statement of principles delineating the supervi-
sory responsibilities of home and host banking regulators over
international banks.47 The Committee entitled the document a
"concordat" to indicate that the agreement did not have the legal
force of a treaty. 48 Rather, the Concordat was a set of guidelines
on bank supervision reached by consensus among banking regu-
lators from many nations.4
9
The objectives of the Concordat were to ensure that the super-
vision of foreign banks was adequate and that no foreign bank
would escape supervision. 50 The Concordat set forth five
principles:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments
should be the joint responsibility of host and parent
authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervi-
sion, each country should ensure that foreign banking estab-
lishments are supervised, and supervision should be adequate
as judged by both host and parent authorities.
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary
responsibility of host authorities since foreign establishments
generally have to conform to local practices for their liquidity
management and must comply with local regulations.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should
be essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case of
subsidiaries, while primary responsibility lies with the host
authority, parent authorities should take account of the expo-
sure of their domestic banks' moral commitment in this
regard.
(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of
information between host and parent authorities and by the
granting of permission for inspections by or on behalf of par-
ent authorities on the territory of the host authority. Every
effort should be made to remove any legal restraints (particu-
larly in the field of professional secrecy or national sover-
46. BASLE CONCORDAT, supra note 32.
47. The home or parent regulator is the one responsible for supervision in the
country where the "parent bank" is headquartered and licensed. The host regulator is
the one responsible for supervision in the foreign country where the "parent bank" is
operating an establishment. See id. at 30.
48. M.S. Mendelsohn, New Basel Concordat: Main Deficiency Is Intact, AM. BANKER, June
16, 1983, at 2.
49. See id. The word "concordat" refers to a "public act of agreement" (as opposed
to a "contract" between private parties). Id. However, the text of the Concordat was
not released to the public for several years following its adoption. Cooke, supra note 39,
at 152.
50. BASLE CONCORDAT, supra note 32, at 29, 30; see also Cane & Barclay, supra note
38, at 321.
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eignty) which might hinder these forms of cooperation. 5'
A central tenet of the Concordat was the joint responsibility of
home and host banking regulators in regulating international
banks.5
2
The Concordat deals primarily with the liquidity, solvency, and
foreign exchange operations of foreign banks.53 Under the Con-
cordat the host supervisory authority was responsible for regulat-
ing liquidity, regardless of the type of banking entity established
in the host nation.54 The supervisory responsibility for solvency
was allocated between host and home regulators depending on
the type of foreign banking establishment involved; subsidiaries
and joint ventures were the responsibility of the host regulator,
while branches were the responsibility of the home regulator.55
The Concordat had several weaknesses. First, despite the
agreement's goal of allocating supervisory responsibility, it left
unclear which regulator should act in order to contain a major
bank failure.5 6 Also, designating the host supervisor as the pri-
mary regulator of the solvency of a foreign bank subsidiary ran
counter to the principle of consolidated supervision used by bank
regulators in most industrialized nations. 57 With these conflict-
ing allocations of responsibility being made in the Concordat,
there was a real danger that host regulators, following consoli-
dated supervision, would look to parent supervisors to regulate a
bank subsidiary's solvency while parent regulators, relying upon
the Concordat, would look to the host supervisor to perform this
task.58
51. W. Peter Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking Organizations: Evolving Tech-
niques for Cooperation Among Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 244,
246 (1981) (summarizing Basle Concordat); see also Richard Dale, Basle Concordat: Lessons
from Ambrosiano, BANKER, Sept. 1983, at 55, 55 (summarizing Basle Concordat).
52. Dale, supra note 45, at 12; see DALE, supra note 37, at 172.
53. See BASLE CONCORDAT, supra note 32, at 29, 30-31.
54. See id. at 30. Liquidity is a measure of a bank's ability to convert assets to cash
or cash-equivalents without diminution of the assets' value.
55. Id. at 30-31. Solvency is a measure of a bank's ability to generate cash flow
sufficient to satisfy its liabilities as they mature and to provide an adequate return to its
shareholders.
56. See Kapstein, supra note 37, at 330.
57. DALE, supra note 37, at 173. Under consolidated supervision, responsibility for
regulating a bank's foreign subsidiaries is shared between host and parent regulators,
with the parent supervisor considering all of the assets and liabilities of the bank, wher-
ever located, in order to determine the bank's overall solvency. See id. at 17.6. See gener-
ally Council Directive 83/350 of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions
on a Consolidated Basis, 1983 OJ. (L 193) 18 (representing the European Community's
adoption of consolidated supervision principles).,
58. DALE, supra note 37, at 173. The "primary motivation" for drafting the Revised
1992] 249
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Another weakness of the Concordat was its lack of specific
supervisory standards for international bank regulators to
employ. 59 This lack of specific standards created confusion
among banking regulators. For instance, in 1979 the FRB pro-
posed that U.S. offices of foreign banks report on the structure
and condition of their parent banks to the FRB, but regulators in
other nations thought this requirement would violate provisions
of the Concordat.60 On another occasion, the FRB was faced
with a three-way international disagreement as to the Concor-
dat's meaning. Swiss regulators believed that host regulators had
primary responsibility for regulating branches and subsidiaries of
foreign banks. In contrast, regulators in Great Britain believed
that host regulators were responsible for supervising only for-
eign bank subsidiaries. Bank regulators in the Netherlands, in yet
another interpretation, believed that the parent regulator was
responsible for the supervision of subsidiaries. 6' In short, lack
of specific standards allowed individual nations to interpret the
Concordat as they wished.
Other misconceptions resulted from the Concordat. The most
important and potentially dangerous was the mistaken belief that
lender of last resort responsibility accompanied supervisory
responsibility. 62 The Committee never intended the Concordat
to deal with lender of last resort responsibility.
63
The Concordat also failed to address complex relationships
between the parent bank and its foreign affiliates. Parent banks
frequently issued letters of comfort to these affiliates, but the sig-
nificance of these letters and other similar financial arrangements
under the Concordat was left uncertain. 64
The financial collapse during the summer of 1982 of the Lux-
embourg subsidiary of the Banco Ambrosiano, an Italian bank,
Concordat, adopted in 1983, was to "incorporate understandings on applying the prin-
ciple of consolidated supervision." Cooke, supra note 39, at 152-53.
59. DALE, supra note 37, at 173.
60. Id. The Federal Reserve eventually received power to enforce such a reporting
requirement under the FBSEA. See infra text accompanying notes 261-277.
61. Id. at 173-74.
62. Id. at 174. Lender of last resort responsibility refers to the obligation of a cen-
tral bank or regulator to provide as much liquidity as necessary to a bank in order to
meet its obligations to depositors and creditors.
63. Id.; Cooke, supra note 39, at 153-54. The Basle Concordat is silent on this
point.
64. See Dale, supra note 51, at 58. A letter of comfort is a commitment by the parent
bank to meet the financial obligations of an affiliate or subsidiary if called upon by a
third party.
[Vol. 26
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tested the principles of the Concordat. The Banco Ambrosiano
subsidiary in Luxembourg had made $1.4 billion worth of impru-
dent loans to Latin American companies. 65 As a result, the sub-
sidiary owed nearly $450 million to its creditors. 66 Unable to pay
its creditors, the bank and its Luxembourg subsidiary collapsed
in July 1982.67
Neither the Luxembourg nor the Italian regulators claimed
supervisory or lender of last resort responsibility for the bank.68
The Italian regulators argued that since they lacked the legal
authority to regulate the Luxembourg subsidiary, they bore little
or no responsibility for its failure. 69 Italian regulators pointed to
their previous attempts to examine the offices of Banco Ambro-
siano in South America, which had been rebuffed by local regula-
tors, as proof of their inability to regulate the foreign subsidiaries
of Banco Ambrosiano and indicated that they would not take
responsibility for the failure of a bank they were unable to super-
vise properly. 70 In contrast, Luxembourg regulators believed
that a subsidiary operating under the same name as its parent
bank (as was the case with the Luxembourg subsidiary of Banco
Ambrosiano) should have been supported either by the parent
bank or indirectly by the central bank of the parent bank.
71
Given that the parent bank of Banco Ambrosiano was headquar-
tered in Italy, Luxembourg regulators believed that the parent
bank or the Italian central bank should have supported the Lux-
embourg subsidiary bank. 72 This explains why Luxembourg reg-
65. Hess, supra note 33, at 189.
66. Id. at 190.
67. Id. at 189-90.
68. DALE, supra note 37, at 175. See generally MAXIMILIAN J.B. HALL, FINANCIAL
DEREGULATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 202
n.32 (1987) (describing the Banco Ambrosiano collapse and its resolution).
69. DALE, supra note 37, at 175; Hess, supra note 33, at 192.
70. Hess, supra note 33, at 192-93.
71. See DALE, supra note 37, at 175; see also Dale, supra note 51, at 57. The turmoil
resulting from Banco Ambrosiano's failure ended when two settlement agreements were
signed: the first between the liquidators of Banco Ambrosiano and the creditors of the
Luxembourg holding company (and its foreign subsidiaries); and the second between
the creditors of Banco Ambrosiano and the creditors of the Vatican bank. Hess, supra
note 33, at 194-95.
In the aftermath of the Banco Ambrosiano affair, the Italian Parliament passed a law
that required disclosure of the shareholder structure of banks and also passed enabling
legislation for the 1983 Council Directive on Supervision. Hess, supra note 33, at 199.
See infra text accompanying notes 228-260 for discussion of European Community direc-
tives concerning international bank regulation.
72. Hess, supra note 33, at 191.
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ulators ignored Italian requests to tighten their supervision of
the Luxembourg, subsidiary of Banco Ambrosiano.
C. The Revised Concordat of 1983
The Basle Committee responded to the collapse of the Luxem-
bourg subsidiary of Banco Ambrosiano by issuing in May 1983 a
reformulation of the Concordat, known as the Revised Concor-
dat.7 3 Even though W. Peter Cooke, chairperson of the Basle
Committee, believed that the failure of Banco Ambrosiano was a
unique event,74 the Basle Committee made substantive changes
to their international regulatory agreement.
The Revised Concordat was not an entirely new agreement,
but built upon the 1975 Concordat. 75 Like its predecessor, it was
a -non-binding agreement that embodied "recommended guide-
lines of best practices." 76 Under the Revised Concordat, nations
still retained authority to license banks with few restrictions-
even banks they were unable to regulate effectively. 77 Further-
more, there was no incentive for compliance with the Revised
Concordant, except for the political pressure or moral authority
that bank regulators could exercise on their recalcitrant col-
leagues. 78 However, with the Revised Concordat the Basle Com-
mittee did attempt to close the supervisory gaps that existed
under the Concordat and to address directly the adequacy of
supervision of foreign financial institutions.
1. "Dual Key" Supervision
As with the 1975 Concordat, a primary objective of the Revised
Concordat was to ensure that no foreign banking establishment
would escape supervision and that each establishment would be
supervised adequately.79 The Revised Concordat introduced a
"dual key" approach whereby both home and host supervisory
authorities assessed the quality of each other's supervision of an
73. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 901; see also Dale, supra note 45, at 12.
74. See HALL, supra note 68, at 166.
75. See HALL, supra note 68, at 166; Cooke, supra note 39, at 152; see also REVISED
CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 901.
76. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 901.
77. See Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 2 (criticizing Basle Committee for repeating
its failure to address lender of last resort responsibility in the Revised Concordat).
78. See id. (noting that the Revised Concordat remained "no more than an informal
agreement").
79. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 903.
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international bank.80 A bank regulator in a host jurisdiction had
to be satisfied that the parent bank was being supervised ade-
quately in the parent jurisdiction, and the parent jurisdiction had
to be satisfied that all foreign operations were being supervised
adequately by local regulators.8 ' If the host regulator considered
the supervision of the parent bank by the parent regulator insuffi-
cient, the host regulator had the right to discourage or prohibit
the foreign bank from operating within the host jurisdiction, or it
could set conditions for the bank's continued operation there.
8 2
Likewise, the parent regulator could :attempt to extend the juris-
dictional reach of its supervision if it did not believe that the host
regulator was providing adequate supervision of the operations
of the foreign bank; alternatively, it could discourage the parent
bank from operating in the host nation. 83 Using this "dual key"
approach, the Committee intended to prevent a "race to the bot-
tom"-the tendency for jurisdictions to relax financial regulation
and supervision in order to attract more foreign investment.
8 4
In the case of the failure of the Luxembourg subsidiary of
Banco Ambrosiano, no regulator took responsibility for the
supervision of the Luxembourg-based bank.85 Applying the
terms of the Revised Concordat to the situation that existed
there, Luxembourg would have had primary responsibility to
supervise the subsidiary, but if the parent regulator (Italy) had
not been satisfied with that supervision, it could have tried to
step in and regulate the bank.8 6 The "dual key" system, as envi-
sioned by the drafters of the Revised Concordat, should have
encouraged nations to make their bank supervision practices
equivalent to those present -in the most stringently regulated
financial centers. This kind of convergence will occur, however,
only if bank regulators are prepared to lock out weakly regulated
80. Dale, supra note 45, at 12.
81. Id.; see REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 903-04. The "dual key" approach
is highly dependent on effective communication and active cooperation among host and
parent regulators. See id. at 901-02.
82. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 903-04; DALE, supra note 37, at 175. This
provision was a concession to U.S. regulatory authorities, whose previous attempts to
monitor the status of foreign parent banks with U.S. offices were met with strong resist-
ance from foreign supervisory authorities. Dale, supra note 51, at 57.
83. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 903; see Hess, supra note 33, at 200.
84. Dale, supra note 45, at 12.
85. DALE, supra note 37, at 175; see supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
86. See REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 903. The Revised Concordat calls for
a concerned parent regulator to extend its supervision in such a manner "to the degree
that it is practicable." Id.
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banks and to prevent their own adequately regulated banks from
expanding to inadequately regulated jurisdictions.8 7 Regulators
must have the fortitude both to prevent foreign banks from oper-
ating in their jurisdictions and to prevent domestic banks from
expanding abroad; the first scenario would result in the loss of
foreign investment, the second in forgone international business
opportunities.
The Revised Concordat allocated supervisory responsibility
between host and parent regulators based on the nature of the
regulatory objective (e.g., liquidity, solvency) to be met and the
type of banking establishment to be regulated. 88 The Revised
Concordat describes three types of foreign banking establish-
ments: branches, subsidiaries, and joint ventures or consortia. A
branch does not have a separate legal status from the parent
bank.89 A subsidiary is a legally independent entity that is
wholly-owned or majority-owned by the parent bank. 90 Joint
ventures or consortia are legally independent institutions owned
by two or more foreign banks. 9'
a. Solvency
The responsibility for the supervision of the solvency of a for-
eign bank depended on the type of bank establishment being
supervised. The parent supervisor was responsible for the regu-
lation of the solvency of a branch because the branch legally was
still a part of the parent bank.92 Parent and host supervisors had
joint responsibility for the supervision of the solvency of a sub-
sidiary:93 the host supervisor because the subsidiary legally was
an independent institution; the parent supervisor due to the prin-
ciple of consolidated supervision 94 and because of the effect of
the subsidiary's activities on the overall financial status of the
parent bank.95 The supervision of the solvency ofjoint ventures
87. DALE, supra note 37, at 176.
88. See generally HALL, supra note 68, at 166-68 (providing a succinct summary of the
Revised Concordat).
89. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 902.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Revised Concordat defines joint ventures as "legally independent insti-
tutions incorporated in the country where their principal operations are conducted and
controlled by two or more parent institutions, most of which are usually foreign and not
all of which are necessarily banks." Id.
92. Id. at 905.
93. Id. at 906.
94. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
95. Id. This provision differs from the original 1975 Concordat, where supervision
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was primarily the responsibility of the regulator in the country of
incorporation of the joint venture. Depending on the corporate
structure of the joint venture, however, the supervisors of the
shareholder (parent) banks of the joint venture also may have
been involved; in such a case, solvency supervision was a joint
parent-host responsibility. 96
b. Liquidity
Under the Revised Concordat, liquidity refers to the ability of a
foreign bank to meet its obligations as they fall due; it does not
refer to lender of last resort responsibilities. 97 Host supervisors
were primarily responsible for supervision of the liquidity of
branches and subsidiaries. 98 Parent regulators also could be con-
cerned with liquidity, as branches may call upon the resources of
the parent bank and the parent bank may issue comfort letters or
other standby instruments to its subsidiaries. 99 The supervision
of the liquidity of joint ventures was primarily the responsibility
of the supervisors of the country where the joint venture was
incorporated. 100
c. Foreign exchange operations
The Revised Concordat also allocated supervisory responsibil-
ity for the foreign exchange operations of foreign banking estab-
lishments. Parent and host regulators jointly supervised the
foreign exchange exposure of foreign banking establishments.10
2. Consolidated Supervision
The Revised Concordat adopted the principle of consolidated
supervision, by which the parent regulator monitors the parent
bank's risk exposure and capital adequacy based on all the opera-
tions of the bank, wherever conducted. 0 2 Drafters of the
Revised Concordat acknowledged that adoption of this concept
of a subsidiary's solvency was primarily the responsibility of the host regulator. BASLE
CONCORDAT, supra note 32, at 31-32.
96. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 906.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 907.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 908. In the U.S. regulatory scheme, foreign exchange is not separately
regulated, but rather is part of the overall supervisory process. Hultman, supra note 26,
at 78.
102. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 905; see DALE, supra note 37, at 176; see
also supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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could extend the traditional limits of a parent regulator's supervi-
sory responsibility. 03  1 i
That consolidated supervision would be difficult to implement
seemed evident from the drafters' treatment of the supervision of
international bank holding companies. The Revised Concordat
designated the host regulator (rather than the parent regulator)
as the primary supervisor Of subsidiary banks belonging-to a bank
holding company, but failed to designate a primary regulator of
the bank holding company.' °4 This would prove to be a very sig-
nificant gap and was a factor in the BCCI crisis. 1° 5 As banks
expand into new and different lines of business, they tend to
develop complex holding company structures. Banco Ambro-
siano's attenuated and far-flung corporate structure allowed it to
escape effective regulation. 106 BCCI likewise took advantage of a
fragmented corporate structure in order to avoid complete regu-
lation.'0 7 Under the terms set forth in the Revised Concordat, a
holding company with independent banks operating in different
countries could avoid meaningful regulation because no one reg-
ulator had responsibility for the parent's overall health. Like-
wise, effective supervision of a holding company with both bank
and non-bank subsidiaries also required the cooperation of dif-
ferent regulators. 0 8
3. Weaknesses of Revised Concordat
Overall, the Revised Concordat differed significantly from the
1975 Concordat. Unlike the 1975 version, it adopted consoli-
dated supervision, an important technique for monitoring the
overall risk exposure and capital adequacy of a bank; introduced
the "dual key" approach; and explicitly stated that it was not
meant to address lender of last resort responsibility.
The Revised Concordat, like its predecessor, also contained
103. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 905.
104. See id. at 904.
105. See Dale, supra note 45, at 12 (pointing out that BCCI's structure was such that it
could avoid stringent consolidated supervision under the Revised Concordat).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72. Banco Ambrosiano consisted of a par-
ent bank in Italy and several foreign subsidiaries, including banks located in Peru, Pan-
ama, and Luxembourg. See Hess, supra note 33, at 189-90. The Luxembourg subsidiary,
Banco Ambrosiano Holding, itself had a Bahamian subsidiary, Banco Ambrosiano Over-
seas Ltd. See id. at 190.
107. See David Lascelles, First Step Towards Tougher Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2,
1991, at 13. See infra text accompanying notes 149-165 (discussing the results of the
complex corporate structure of BCCI and its affiliates).
108. See REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 904.
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some weaknesses. One major problem was the explicit refusal -to
address the issue of lender of last resort responsibility. 0 9 Theo-
retically, if banking regulators cooperate to prevent bank failures,
they should also cooperate in upholding the international bank-
ing system when a failure is imminent. The Revised Concordat,
however, lacked any statement on what should happen if this
supervisory system failed." t0
The Basle Committee did not address lender of last resort
responsibility because some members of the Committee were not
central banks and thus lacked any lending power with which to
support failing banks."' More fundamentally, the issue was
avoided because the central banks of the industrialized nations
had previously stated, albeit vaguely, that they would support the
liquidity of the international markets in times of crisis."112 If a
major bank failed or another major financial disruption occurred,
the central banks of the major industrialized nations would pro-
vide enough funds to prevent a liquidity crisis. In drafting the
Revised Concordat the central bankers sought to leave this prior
commitment vague in order to encourage private sector disci-
pline. 3 The central bankers had to create a delicate balance
between creating confidence in financial markets and not encour-
aging reckless behavior by financial institutions.
The Revised Concordat purposely blurred host and parent
regulatory responsibilities in order to avoid the pointing of fin-
gers that occurred among regulators after the 1982 failure of
Banco Ambrosiano." 4 In doing so, however, it also appeared to
create problems of overlapping authority and responsibility in
cases where one regulator was designated the primary regulator,
but another regulator also had a strong interest in maintaining
effective supervision over a foreign bank. 1 5 This blurring of
responsibility created uncertainty for regulators over their super-
109. Id. at 901 (stating that Revised Concordat does not address lender of last resort
responsibility); Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 2.
110. David W. Wise, International Prudential Regulation of Commercial Banks, BANK
ADMIN., June 1985, at 58, 62. "Just as laws should provide for their own enforcement,
supervision should provide for the eventuality that such supervision can fail." Id.
111. Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 2.
112. See, e.g., id. (noting statement of support of Euromarkets still applies).
113. Id.
114. Wise, supra note 110, at 62. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
115. E.g., REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 906 (stating that the countries in
which joint ventures are incorporated (host countries) have primary responsibility for
supervising the joint venture, but that the parent regulators of banks that are sharehold-
ers in the joint venture cannot ignore supervision of the joint venture).
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visory responsibilities."i 6 In theory, the parent regulator ulti-
mately should have responsibility for the safety and soundness of
its banks-in all of their forms and establishments, foreign and
domestic. The principle of consolidated supervision allows a
parent regulator, in the course of enforcing its own regulations,
to approve or disapprove of its banks' foreign operation.' 17 This
power would prevent crises in the foreign establishments of its
domestic banks, while assuring the health of the domestic banks
as well. Despite significant improvements over the original Con-
cordat, the Revised Concordat left gaps in the coordination of
international bank regulations-gaps that BCCI would later
exploit.
IV. BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL
A. The Closing of BCCI
1. International Closings
In a coordinated action on July 5, 1991, regulators in eight
nations closed all the BCCI branches located within their juris-
dictions."t 8 At the time BCCI had total assets of approximately
$20 billion and was operating in sixty-nine countries, with the
largest concentration of its deposits in the United Kingdom. 119
Due to the absence of any international law governing the clo-
sure of an international bank, local regulators acted under sepa-
rate national laws.' 20 By July 6, 1991, BCCI offices in eighteen
countries either were closed or had had their operations
116. Wise, supra note 110, at 62.
117. See id.
118. Max Hall, The BCCI Affair, BANKING WORLD, Sept. 1991, at 8. The eight nations
were the Cayman Islands, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. Indeed, on that day, action to shut down
BCCI's activities was taken in more than sixty nations. Id.
119. Federal Reserve System, Statement by . Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, and
William Taylor, Staff Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, and E. Gerald Corrigan, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
September 13, 1991, 77 FED. RES. BULL. 902, 905 (1991) [hereinafter Mattingly Statement].
BCCI was no longer accepting retail deposits in its U.S. offices because of actions taken
previously by U.S. bank regulators. Id. at 907. See infra text accompanying note 131-
132.
120. Cf Claire Makin, Learning From BCCI, iNSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1991, at
93, 94-95 (discussing various local investigations into BCCI and the lack of overall inter-
national accountability). In a 1989 interview, former BCCI chief executive Swaleh Naqvi
acknowledged that "[b]ecause we do not have a dominant presence in any single coun-
try, the full impact of what we are doing is not visible." Id. at 94.
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restricted.121 The closure of BCCI branches continued for sev-
eral weeks, and by July 29, 1991 forty-four jurisdictions had
closed BCCI offices located within their borders. a22
The immediate reason for the closure of BCCI was the Bank of
England's receipt of a June 1991 report prepared by Price
Waterhouse that detailed massive fraud committed by BCCI's
senior managers.' 23 Through the mid-1980s the treasury opera-
tions of BCCI suffered huge losses. Senior managers siphoned
off deposits to cover these losses.' 24 If the depositors withdrew
their money, then other deposits were diverted to cover the
losses. This practice resulted in an endless series of fraudulent
transactions.125 The report revealed that senior managers,
board members, and representatives of major shareholders par-
ticipated in the fraud by making fictitious loans; failing to record
deposits; and dealing in their own shares in order to manufacture
profits. 126 BCCI also used client names to trade on its own
account.' 27 BCCI managers hid the losses caused by bad trades,
unpaid loans, and fraudulent practices by shuttling assets
between subsidiaries.128 In 1988 alone BCCI subsidiaries paid
each other $152 million in fee income. 29
Regulators in both the United States and England had been
concerned about the safety and soundness of BCCI for years
before the bank finally was closed. BCCI pleaded guilty in 1988
121. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 903.
122. Id.
123. Hall, supra note 118, at 8. The Bank of England had commissioned the report
under section 41 of the 1987 Banking Act, which permits the investigation of banks on
behalf of depositors. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 22, § 41, 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND AND WALES 527, 574-76 (4th ed. 1987).
124. David Lascelles, A Never-ending Spiral of Fraud, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at 32.
There are estimates that BCCI raised over $600 million in unrecorded deposits. See All
Things to All Men, THE ECONOMIST, July 27, 1991, at 67, 68.
125. Lascelles, supra note 124, at 32.
126. Hall, supra note 118, at 8. For example, BCCI reported loans of $445 million to
Ghaith Pharaon, a Saudi business executive, and $796 million to the Gokal family in
Pakistan; both borrowers were shareholders of First American Bankshares, which was
secretly owned by BCCI. These loans were not secured with any assets, nor were they in
fact made to the named individuals. SeeJonathan Friedland, Rest in Pieces, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Sept. 26, 1991, at 64, 66. See generally JAMES R. ADAMS & DOUGLAS FRANZ, A FULL
SERVICE BANK: How BCCI STOLE BILLIONS AROUND THE WORLD (1992).
127. All Things to All Men, supra note 124, at 67.
128. The Many Facades of BCCI, THE ECONOMIST, July 13, 1991, at 81. In addition,
Price Waterhouse discovered a secret "bank within a bank," controlled by top BCCI
officials, which hid losses and plugged holes in the balance sheets by raising deposits
without recording them. Id.
129. Id.
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to charges of money laundering in Tampa, Florida. I3 0 On June
12, 1989, the FRB issued a cease and desist order requiring
BCCI to strengthen its U.S. operations and to comply with cur-
rency reporting regulations.' 3 ' The FRB issued a second cease
and desist order against BCCI on March 4, 1991, ordering it to
strengthen the funding of its U.S. agency offices.13 2 In February
1990, Price Waterhouse, BCCI's auditor, refused to sign off on
the BCCI financial statements for 1989 and subsequently
reported to the BCCI board and the Bank of England its con-
cerns of fraud at BCCI. 3 3 In April 1990, the Bank of England
permitted the government of Abu Dhabi to increase its invest-
ment in BCCI-in.effect to bail out the bank. ' 3 4 Six months later,
in October 1990, Price Waterhouse delivered to the BCCI board
a follow-up to its April report, detailing the bank's massive loan
problems. 135
2. The BCCI Scandal in the United States
After receiving evidence from Price Waterhouse of BCCI's
massive wrongdoing, the Bank of England, in a coordinated
strike with regulators in the United States and other nations,
closed BCCI in July 1991.'36 Also in July, the FRB took enforce-
ment action against BCCI and BCCI officials for their involve-
ment in the allegedly illegal acquisitions of the Independence
Bank of Encino, California, the National Bank of Georgia, Cen-
Trust Savings Bank, and Credit and Commerce American Hold-
ings (CCAH), the parent company of First American
Bankshares. 3 7 On July 29, 1991, a New York state grand jury
130. All Things to All Men, supra note 124, at 68; see Mattingly Statement, supra note 119,
at 906.
131. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 907. The consent order "required BCCI
to implement an extensive Bank Secrecy Act compliance program, including personnel
training at each of its locations and to monitor and report 'suspicious activity.' " BCCI
Plea Deal Stirs Controversy, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, Feb. 1990, at 1, 2.
132. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 907. This order called for BCCI to cease
all banking activities in the United States by the end of 1991. Id. See Alan Friedman, Fed
Takes Action on BCCI, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at 3.
133. 1987-1992: The Morning After, INSTITUrIONAL INVESTOR, July 1992, at 197.
134. Id.; see Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 907.
135. Richard Dale, Reflections on the BCCI Affair: A United Kingdom Perspective, 26 INT'L
LAw. 949, 961 (1992); Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 907. See generally Sympo-
sium, International Bank Supervision Post BCCI, 26 INT'L LAw. 943"(1992).
136. 1987-1992: The Morning After, supra note 133, at 204; see Patrick Stewart & Rich-
ard Phillips, BCCI Breakdown, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1992, at 14; supra text accompany-
ing notes 118-129.
137. Federal Reserve System, Statement by j Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, and
William. Taylor, Staff Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors
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indicted BCCI, related companies, and two founders of BCCI for
bank fraud. 3 8 The fiduciaries administering the affairs of BCCI
pleaded guilty to federal and state criminal charges on December
19, 1991, agreeing to pay a $10 million fine and to forfeit over
$550 million in BCCI assets located in the United States. 3 9 Half
of these assets will fund capital for BCCI-affiliated institutions in
the United States and half of the assets will be held for a "World-
wide Victim's Fund."'1
40
The secret ownership of U.S. financial institutions by BCCI
and its affiliates has attracted a great deal of press attention in the
United States. BCCI secretly controlled four U.S. banks: First
American Bank, headquartered in Washington, D.C.; the
National Bank of Georgia; CenTrust Savings Bank of Florida;
and the Independence Bank of Encino, California.' 4 1 Eight of
BCCI's largest customers used $1.4 billion borrowed from BCCI
to buy shares in CCAH.142 Furthermore, onJuly 29, 1992 federal
and state authorities brought indictments against Robert Altman,
Clark Clifford, Agha Hasan Abedi, Swaleh Naqvi, and Ghaith
Pharaon, alleging that they had paid bribes to officials in Third
World nations to ensure favorable treatment and to cover up
fraudulent practices.
43
The indictments also accuse Altman and Clifford of illegal
of the Federal Reserve System, Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, August 1, 1991, 77 FED. RES.
BULL. 791, 795-96 (1991) [hereinafter Mattingly & Taylor Statement]; Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Statement by I Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, May 14, 1992, 78 FED. RES. BULL. 504, 505
(1992) [hereinafter Second Mattingly Statement].
138. The Opening-up of BCCI: Send for Richard Hannay, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1991,
at 21, 23.
139. Max Hall, The BCCI Affair, BANKING WORLD, Feb. 1992, at 10; see also Second Mat-
tingly Statement, supra note 137, at 506 (summarizing disposition of state and federal
charges). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia approved this agreement
on January 24, 1992, as had the New York state court on December 20, 1991. Id.
140. Hall, supra note 139, at 10. Both the New.York and federal prosecutions
charged First American Bankshares with violations of banking law. Although both
indictments contain similar allegations, the indictments are different and allege viola-
tions of different laws. Id.
141. See Second Mattingly Statement, supra note 137, at 505; The Opening-up of BCCI, supra
note 138, at 23.
142. Lascelles, supra note 124, at 32.
143. Alan Friedman & George Graham, Bank Regulators Bribed by BCCI, US Suit Alleges,
FIN. TIMEs,July 30, 1992, at 1. Altman was president of First American and Clark Clif-
ford's law partner. Clifford was chairman of First American and a former U.S. defense
secretary. Abedi founded BCCI in the early 1970s; Naqvi is the former chief executive
officer of BCCI; and Pharaon is a Saudi Arabian business executive. Id. See generally Rich-
1992]
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ.
activity undertaken for personal gain. The state indictments
against them allege that they received bribes in the guise of legal
fees and sham stock transactions for facilitating BCCI's purchase
of a controlling interest in First American Bankshares. 144 The
federal indictment tracks the state indictment and alleges that
Clifford and Altman defrauded the FRB in their representation of
First American Bankshares. 145
Clifford and Altman pleaded innocent to the criminal charges
on July 29, 1992.146 Sheikh Kamal Adham, a principal share-
holder and borrower of BCCI, has pleaded guilty to criminal
charges and has agreed to cooperate with prosecutors. 147 The
trial on the state charges against Altman, after numerous
reschedulings, began in New York in April 1993.148
B. BCCI's International Corporate Structure and Regulatory
Difficulties Resulting Therefrom
While the trials of the individuals involved in the BCCI scandal
will attract most of the public's attention in the short term, the
scandal will have long-term ramifications on international bank-
ing regulation. BCCI's complex corporate structure aided the
bank's evasion of comprehensive regulation. 49  Like Banco
Ambrosiano, BCCI used a holding company structure with the
holding company headquartered in Luxembourg.15 0 The hold-
ing company's two principal banking subsidiaries were Bank of
Credit and Commerce International, S.A., incorporated in Lux-
embourg; and Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(Overseas) Ltd., incorporated in the Cayman Islands.' 51 BCCI
created other separate subsidiaries in different jurisdictions
ard Donkin, Global Trial of Bribery, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 1992, at 6 (outlining contents of
the indictments).
144. Peter Truell & Thomas Petzinger, Jr., Clifford, Altman Are Accused of Taking Over
$40 Million in Bribes From BCCI, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1992, at A3.
145. Id.
146. See Friedman & Graham, supra note 143, at 1; Truell & Petzinger, supra note
144, at A3.
147. Truell & Petzinger, supra note 144, at A3.
148. Sharon Walsh, Trial Date at Issue Again for Figures in BCCI Case, WASH. POST, Jan.
23, 1993, at GI. See generally Gayjervey & Stuart Taylor, Jr., From Statesman to Front Man:
How Clark Clifford's Career Crashed, AM. LAw., Nov. 1992, at 49 (giving background on
Clark Clifford's and Robert Altman's involvement with BCCI and First American
Bankshares).
149. See Makin, supra note 120, at 94.
150. Hall, supra note 118, at 10. The Luxembourg holding company was BCCI
Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 905.
151. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 905.
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where the bank operated. 52 This complex corporate structure
allowed BCCI to take advantage of a weakness in the Revised
Concordat: the failure to assign responsibility for regulation of
banking holding companies, which left all responsibility in this
instance to the authorities required to regulate the various hold-
ing company subsidiaries located in separate jurisdictions. 5 3
This corporate structure also allowed BCCI to use two separate
auditors, making comprehensive regulation difficult; BCCI never
had to show a consolidated financial statement to any one bank
regulator. 54 Because of its corporate structure, therefore, BCCI
never developed a natural "home base" and no single bank regu-
lator ever supervised the entire bank's operation. 155
In addition, the location of BCCI's principal banking subsidiar-
ies in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands contributed to the
magnitude of the scandal. These countries are noted for their lax
financial regulation as well as their strict bank secrecy laws-two
characteristics that tend to create an environment in which fraud
can occur without the knowledge of bank regulators.' 56 Under
Luxembourg law, the Luxembourg holding company-parent of
all BCCI subsidiaries-was not even considered a bank; it thus
escaped bank supervision in Luxembourg. 57 But even if Luxem-
bourg wished to regulate the holding company, it might not have
been successful. To avoid more probing regulation, BCCI held
many of its questionable assets in the Cayman Islands subsidiary,
152. Mattingly & Taylor Statement, supra note 137, at 791-92; see Mattingly Statement,
supra note 119, at 905-06.
153. See Dale, supra note 45, at 12. The Revised Concordat provided only that
"[w]here holding companies are at the head of groups that include separately incorpo-
rated banks operating in different countries, the authorities responsible for supervising
those banks should endeavour to co-ordinate their supervision of those banks, taking
account of the overall structure of the group in question." REVISED CONCORDAT, supra
note 43, at 904 (emphasis added). Under the Revised Concordat, host regulators had
sole responsibility for regulating the liquidity of foreign subsidiaries and shared respon-
sibility for regulating foreign subsidiaries' solvency and foreign currency operations
jointly with parent bank regulators. Id. at 906-08.
154. Rob Norton, Lessons from BCCI, FORTUNE, Sept. 9, 1991, at 153, 154; see also Hall,
supra note 118, at 9 (suggesting that BCCI may have directly prevented its various audi-
tors from communicating with each other and from understanding very sensitive bank
documents).
155. Lascelles, supra note 107 at 13; Makin, supra note 120, at 94.
156. See Richard Dale, BCCI: Regulatory Rights and Wrongs, FIN. REG. REP., July 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FRR File; see also Jeff Gerth, Scandal Reveals Holes in
Rules for Foreign Banks, N.Y. TIMES,July 7, 1991, at A13 (labelling Luxembourg a "haven
for intensely private banking operations"); Steven Prokesch, Regulation of BCCI Is Faulted,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1992, at DI (noting that both countries "are widely regarded as
having weak regulatory systems").
157. Dale, supra note 45, at 12.
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beyond the jurisdiction of Luxembourg regulators.1 8
Although the entire bank was never supervised by a single reg-
ulator, the two principal BCCI subsidiaries were supposed to be
supervised by the regulators in their respective jurisdictions-the
Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois (ILM) and the Cayman
Islands Inspectorate of Banks.' 59 This supervision was inade-
quate. Luxembourg regulators had admitted in the late 1980s
that they lacked the ability to supervise effectively the BCCI sub-
sidiary located within their jurisdiction and requested that BCCI
reincorporate the subsidiary in another country, but Luxem-
bourg never acted upon this request. 60 In 1988 Pierre Jaans,
director of the ILM, stated that BCCI had "no clear home coun-
try supervision."161 With only fifteen bank examiners responsi-
ble for the entire country, 162 it became clear that Luxembourg
lacked the resources to supervise BCCI.
To compensate for this lack of supervisory resources, bank
regulators from the Cayman Islands, France, Hong Kong, Lux-
embourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the
United Kingdom coordinated their regulatory efforts in 1987 and
created a "college of regulators" to supervise BCCI. 63 The reg-
ulators coordinated supervisory responsibilities among them-
selves. 64 This scheme was an unworkable solution and allowed
regulators to shift responsibility for any BCCI transgression
among themselves. No single regulator had any incentive to reg-
ulate BCCI properly, and the regulators did not cooperate
among themselves in sharing information on BCCI opera-
tions. 165 This arrangement proved not to be effective and was
only a slight improvement over what had previously existed.
158. See Gerth, supra note 156, at A13. BCCI " 'parked' its shadiest assets in the
Cayman Islands. This meant that the Luxembourg authority saw little of what was going
on." Lascelles, supra note 107, at 13.
159. Hall, supra note 118, at 9.
160. Id.; see also Prokesch, supra note 156, at D7 (stating that Luxembourg regulators
had put a one year deadline for compliance on their request).
161. Gerth, supra note 156, at A13.
162. Id.
163. Hall, supra note 118, at 10.
164. See id.
165. Id. "The dispersal of supervisory responsibilities within the [college] and the
difficulties in getting agreement on coordinated action, however, served only to delay
the day of reckoning at BCCI. " Id. The college also has been criticized for its failure to
cooperate with the FRB. See Stewart & Phillips, supra note 136, at 14.
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C. Liquidation of BCCI
After the closure of BCCI in July 1991, the Bank of England
petitioned the English courts to liquidate the United Kingdom
branches of BCCI, S.A. (the Luxembourg subsidiary) on grounds
of fraudulent management, concealment of fraud, inadequate
accounting records, and the bank's insolvency, among others.' 66
Touche Ross, the appointed liquidator of BCCI, stated in its ini-
tial report in December 1991 that BCCI had assets of $1.159 bil-
lion and liabilities of $10.641 billion. 167 Subsequently, Touche
Ross developed a plan whereby .all of the world-wide assets of
BCCI would be pooled and used to pay off creditors. 6s The con-
fusion and delay in liquidating BCCI added to the impetus to
improve international bank regulation so that the risks of future
bank failures could be reduced.
D. Impetus for a New Regulatory Agreement Governing
International Banking
The BCCI affair was "a case of systematic and deliberate crimi-
nal fraud.... [in which] BCCI took maximum advantage of an
unsupervised cooperate [sic] structure to conceal and warehouse
in bank secrecy jurisdictions billions of dollars in fraudulent
transactions."' 169 BCCI was able to take advantage of technologi-
cal advances that allowed it to shift funds world-wide very
quickly. As the banking industry becomes global, the potential
for global fraud grows concurrently.
Some commentators and regulators believe that the BCCI
affair was a unique case.' 70 Unfortunately, similar statements
were made about the earlier failures of Banco Ambrosiano and
the Herstatt Bank.' 7' While deliberate fraud on the scale of
BCCI may be unlikely to reoccur, a large bank failure, given the
current precarious economic times, is not improbable. For that
reason, the British government appointed Lord Justice Bingham
to lead a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the regu-
166. Hall, supra note 118, at 8.
167. BCCI: The Never-ending Story, THE BANKER, Jan. 1992, at 4. It was estimated ini-
tially that BCCI's unrecoverable losses amounted to at least $4 billion. The Many Facades
of BCCI, supra note 128, at 81.
168. Stewart & Phillips, supra note 136, at 14. This scheme has been dubbed the
"Luxembourg Plan." Id.
169. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 905.
170. See Lascelles, supra note 107, at 13; Makin, supra note 120, at 94 (citing assur-
ances made by bank supervisors that BCCI was unique).
171. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 74.
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lation of BCCI in the United Kingdom.172 Bingham's report was
released in October 1992.173 It severely criticized the actions of
the Bank of England in the BCCI affair 74 and recommended that
Parliament adopt laws that would allow the Bank of England to
refuse or revoke the authorization of banks whose corporate
structures hinder proper supervision.17 5
The circumstances surrounding the closure of BCCI call into
question the "adequacy of international supervisory arrange-
ments" of international banks.' 76 National banking laws must
adhere to an international supervisory standard so that banks are
unable to take advantage of the gaps in supervision created by lax
jurisdictions. In other words, if all jurisdictions met a common
minimum standard of bank supervision, there would be no lax
jurisdiction in which banks could operate.
The Basle Committee began discussions of the ramifications of
the BCCI closure almost immediately after the fact. 177 In light of
the closure of BCCI, the committee members generally agreed
that there was a need to strengthen the supervision provisions of
the Revised Concordat."18 To this end, in July 1992 the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision issued "Minimum Standards
for the supervision of International Banking Groups and Their
Cross-Border Establishments."'179
V. THE BASLE COMMITTEE RESPONSE TO BCCI: THE NEW
MINIMUM STANDARDS
A. Explanation
In the new standards, the Basle Committee agreed to tighten
international bank supervision. 80 Generally, the Committee
172. See The Opening-up of BCCI, supra note 138, at 22-23.
173. HOUSE OF COMMONS, INQUIRY INTO THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANK OF CREDIT
AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (1992) (on file with The George Washington Journal of Inter-
national Law and Economics).
174. Id. para. 2.483, at 149; see also id. paras. 2.1-.484, at 29-150 (discussing Bank's
long term supervision of BCCI).
175. Id. paras. 3.13-.16, at 183-84.
176. Hall, supra note 118, at 8.
177. The new Minimum Standards were issued in June 1992, less then a year after
BCCI was completely closed. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7. The drafters
somewhat cryptically noted that they began their work on the standards "[flollowing
recent developments." Id. at 1.
178. Seeid. at 1.
179. Id.
180. See Steven Prokesch, Regulators Agree on Rules to Prevent More B.C.C.I. 's, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1992, at DI.
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reformulated the principles reflected in the Concordat and the
Revised Concordat into Minimum Standards for bank supervi-
sion.' 8 1 The main features of the new Minimum Standards are
that: (1) all international banks and banking groups should be
supervised by a "home-country" regulator; (2) an international
bank should obtain the permission of both the host and home
regulators before opening a branch or other banking establish-
ment in a foreign nation; (3) banking regulators should have the
right to gather information from international banks; (4) if the
minimum standards are not met, a host regulator may impose
restrictive measures against the international bank; and (5) infor-
mation exchanges between regulators in different nations should
continue to be encouraged.
8 2
1. Paramount Concern: Consolidated Supervision
The Minimum Standards specifically state that all international
banks should be subject to consolidated supervision by their
home regulators. 8 3 Consolidated supervision requires that the
home-country regulator receive information that can be con-
firmed as reliable on the global operations of the particular inter-
national bank.'8 4 This information is then assessed as to the light
it sheds on the safety and soundness of the international bank.18 5
Under the Minimum Standards, home-country bank regulators
can prevent the creation of corporate affiliations that undermine
the application of consolidated supervision or that hinder effec-
tive regulation, 8 6 and they can prevent the opening of banking
establishments in a foreign jurisdiction if, for example, they are
not satisfied with that host country's supervision of foreign
banks.' 8 7
The host-country regulator likewise has the responsibility to
ensure that the home-country regulator has the ability to meet
these minimum standards. 88 According to the Minimum Stan-
181. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 1. The 1990 Supplement to the Revised
Concordat concerning "Information flows between banking supervisory authorities"
was not made part of the Minimum Standards. Id. at 2.
182. International Panel on Banking Revises Minimum Standards, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1992,
at C25. The Minimum Standards use the terms "home-country" and "host-country" in
lieu of "parent" and "host."
183. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 3.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 3-4.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 3.
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dardsi an international bank must receive permission from both
its home-country and host-country regulators before opening a
cross-border banking establishment.'8 9 In determining whether
to approve a foreign. operation,. the host-country regulator can
consider the bank's strength of capital, organization,, and operat-
ing procedures forrisk management. 90 The approval of any new
banking establishment should be contingent upon a multilateral
agreement among-regulators that each may gather the informa-
tion necessary for. effective home-country supervision. That is,
regulators should reach a mutual understanding that they can
gather information from establishments within each other's
jurisdiction.' 9.1
The Minimum Standards make the same allocation of supervi-
sory responsibilities between home-country and host-country
regulators as was set forth in the Revised Concordat, except in
cases where the regulators have decided that that allocation is
inappropriate. 92 If a regulator determines that this allocation is
not appropriate in the regulation of a particular bank, then it
must reach an explicit agreement with its counterpart on a more
appropriate allocation of supervisory responsibility. 93 In other
words, under the Minimum Standards there can be no evasion of
responsibility. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
the Revised Concordat allocates supervisory responsibilities.
The host-country regulator has responsibility for determining
whether the international bank will in fact be subject to consoli-
dated supervision in the home-country as required by the Mini-
mum Standards. 94 The host regulator should consider whether
the bank is incorporated in a nation with which the host regulator
has a mutual understanding for the exchange of information;
whether the home-country regulator has given its consent for the
new banking establishment; and whether the home-country regu-
lator has the capability to perform consolidated supervision. 195 If
the Minimum Standards are not met, the host-country regulator
189. Id at 4.
190. Id at 4. The home-country regulator, of course, should consider the same fac-
tors. Id.
191. Id. at 5-6.
192. See id. The allocations referred to are found at REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note
43, at 905-08. See supra text accompanying notes 92-101.
193. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 5.
194. See id. at 6.
195. Id.
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should prevent the opening of the new banking establishment: 96
Alternatively, in its sole discretion, the host-country regulator
may choose to allow the establishment of a branch subject to any
regulatory restrictions it may deem necessary and appropriate. 19 7
The host regulator, however, will then have responsibility for
regulating the establishment on a " 'stand alone' consolidated
basis." 198 The discretion of a host-country regulator to allow the
operation of a bank which does not meet minimum standards of
supervision is a potentially broad exception to the Minimum
Standards.
In its statement accompanying the issuance of the Minimum
Standards, the Basle Committee stated, "The minimum stan-
dards are designed to provide greater assurarices that in the
future no international bank can operate without being subject to
effective, consolidated supervision."' 199 The Minimum Standards
themselves make clear that consolidated supervision is a vital reg-
ulatory principle and that no further debate on its importance is
required. E. Gerald Corrigan, chairperson of the Basle Commit-
tee, reiterated this point when he stated that a goal of the mini-
mum standards was to ensure that all international banks were
subject to consolidated supervision. 200
Under the new standards, the home-country regulator is
clearly the primary regulator of the foreign banking establish-
ments of-a bank incorporated in the home country.20' According
to the new standards, a single bank regulator must exercise pri-
mary regulatory authority over an international bank.20 2 This
prevents any sort of collegial regulatory arrangement, similar to
the one that attempted to supervise BCCI for several years.20 3
196. Id. This course of action is not necessary if the home-country regulators are
willing and able to "initiate the effort to take measures to meet these standards." See id.
197. Id. at 6-7.
198. Id. at 7.
199. Maggie Fox, Watchdog Writes Standards to Stop BCCI-type Frauds, REUTER Bus.
REP., July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
200. Bask Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Prevent Fraud, Daily
Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 130, at A-I (July 7, 1992).
201. Erik Ipsen, Central Bankers Unveil New Anti-Fraud Rules, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July
7, 1992, at 9; see MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 3.
202. Learning from BCCI, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1992, at 18. Specifically, the Minimum
Standards state that "[a]ll . . . international banks should be supervised by a home-
country authority that capably performs consolidated supervision." MINIMUM STAN-
DARDS, supra note 3, at 3.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 163-165.
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2. Requirement of Dual Approval for Foreign Banking
Establishments
The most important change provided in the new standards is
formalization of the principle that an international bank must
receive the permission of both home and host regulators before it
can open a foreign banking establishment. 20 4 This double
approval for the establishment of a new foreign branch will pre-
vent the fingerpointing that has occurred in the past after a bank
failure.205 In approving the foreign banking establishment, the
host regulator should be satisfied that the home regulator will
supervise the foreign bank on a consolidated basis. 20 6 If not sat-
isfied, the host regulator can prevent the foreign bank from
opening the branch.20
7
B. Analysis: Implementation and Effect of
Minimum Standards Uncertain
Problems exist with the implementation of the new Minimum
Standards. Some are purely pragmatic. For instance, both
home-country and host-country regulators may have difficulty
obtaining information concerning a non-financial company that
owns a bank. Industrial companies generally are not subject to
the same degree of regulation as banks and therefore publicly
disclose less information about their financial affairs.
A second basic problem could be lack of adequate resources.
For example, if the new standards had been in place in 1991, the
BCCI fraud would have been more difficult to conceal because a
single regulator (Luxembourg) would have been in charge.20 8
With its limited regulatory resources, 20 9 however, Luxembourg
most likely would not have been able to detect the fraud.
In addition to these ministerial difficulties that might thwart
204. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 4; see also Ipsen, supra note 201, at 9.
205. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Prevent Fraud, supra
note 200, at A-I. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72 and 159-165.
206. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 4; Learning from BCCI, supra note 202,
at 18.
207. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that the host-country regula-
tor should prevent creation of a foreign bank establishment when it is dissatisfied with
the home-country's supervision).
208. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 3 ("All international banking groups
... should be supervised by a home-country authority that capably performs consoli-
dated supervision."). Luxembourg would have been BCCI's "home-country authority"
because BCCI's parent holding company was incorporated there. See supra text accom-
panying note 150.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 160-162.
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implementation of the Minimum Standards, the standards them-
selves contain fundamental flaws.
1. Gaps in New Standards
Despite the improvement. they represent, the Minimum Stan-
dards contain a gap that banks could exploit to avoid regulation.
A host regulator can still choose to allow a foreign banking estab-
lishment to operate in its jurisdiction even if the establishment's
home regulator does not comply with the Minimum Standards.210
The host-country regulator need only impose the restrictions it
deems "necessary and appropriate" on this establishment.2 1'
Further, the standards focus on the establishment of new
branches but do not explicitly apply to existing bank branches.2 12
The standards may prevent the entry of an unsuitable new estab-
lishment into international banking, but the next failure-prone
bank may be operating already. Without an explicit statement in
the new standards, retroactive application of the standards will
vary by nation. 213
The new Minimum Standards generally encourage the flow of
information among bank regulators. 214 The standards are pur-
posely vague, however, in order to allow regulators the flexibility
to interpret them on a case-by-case basis.215 They are designed
to encourage cooperation between home-country and host-coun-
try regulators, and their operation may serve as an informal early
warning system that would identify problem banks more rap-
210. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 6-7; see also Rod McNeil, Basel Group's Bank
Supervision Plan to Step Up International Coordination, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REG., July
13, 1992, at 1, 2 (summarizing this provision).
211. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 7. The standards nevertheless require the
host-country regulator to supervise the establishment adequately. See id.
212. Three of the Minimum Standards' four principles apply solely to the creation of
a new banking establishment. See id. at 3-7. The first principle (requiring adequate
home-country consolidated supervision) is phrased as "a condition for the creation and
maintenance of cross-border banking establishments" and arguably may apply to existing
establishments. Id. at 3. See also Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards
to Prevent Fraud, supra note 200, at A-I (quoting Mr. Corrigan of the Basle Committee as
saying that Minimum Standards "would 'by implication at least' be able to be applied to
existing branches").
213. Learning from BCCI, supra note 202, at 18. This is expected to be a long and
cumbersome process. Id.
214. See, e.g., MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 2 (encouraging cooperative
efforts), 5-6 (conditioning establishment of cross-border banks on bilateral information
exchange agreements).
215. Cf MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 3 ("The following four minimum stan-
dards are to be applied by individual supervisory authorities in their own assessment of
their relations with supervisory authorities in other countries.").
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idly. 21 6 The success of the standards will depend on how accu-
rately regulators evaluate the adequacy of supervisory standards
of other countries.
2. Problems of Voluntary Compliance
Like the Concordat and the Revised Concordat that preceded
them, the Minimum Standards are not a treaty and do not have
the force of law. The Basle Committee, therefore, must rely on
regulators' moral authority and informal pressure to enforce
them. Furthermore, national regulators will implement the stan-
dards in isolation from one another, thus allowing discrepancies
in enforcement among nations to develop. For instance, penal-
ties for violation of banking laws or regulations based on the
standards will rest with the individual country regulators.
Further complicating the efficacy of voluntary compliance is
the fact that implementation of the new standards may require
changes in the domestic laws of some nations. For example, it is
questionable whether current U.S. law would allow a foreign reg-
ulator to obtain information from a banking establishment in the
United States that is involved in an ongoing criminal or grand
jury investigation.21 7 While the standards encourage the flow of
information among regulators, some nations' bank secrecy laws
may prevent this free exchange of information. If the Minimum
Standards had the force of law, they would override such con-
trary local law.2 ' 8
In addition to problems of voluntary compliance, there are
entire segments of the banking community that the Minimum
Standards do not affect. The.Basle Committee's membership is
limited to regulators from the industrialized nations. The stan-
dards, therefore, at first apply only to those nations. 21 9 In 1974
the G-10 nations whose regulators make up the Committee con-
216. See Neil Bennett, Bankers Tighten Rules in Fight Against Fraud, THE TIMES
(London), July 7, 1992, at 21.
217. Prokesch, supra note 180, at D6.
218. The Basle Committee itself admits that the Minimum Standards have some limi-
tations. The chairperson of the Basle Committee has stated that the new standards will
not prevent the occurrence of all fraud. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New
Standards to Prevent Fraud, supra note 200, at A-1.
219. See supra note 1. Other nations are free to adopt the Committee's standards, as
they did with the Committee's Basle Accord on International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, which was adopted in July 1988. Peter Cooke,
Preface to PRICE WATERHOUSE, BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND CAPITAL CONVERGENCE 1
(1991).
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trolled ninety percent of the assets of the world's banks.220 In
1991 the G-10 nations controlled only eighty percent of the
world's banking assets.221 A significant portion of the world's
bank assets are therefore not governed by the Minimum
Standards.
3. Perceived Discrimination
Some critics argue that the Basle Committee designed the new
standards to prevent the development of large banks in the Third
World, saying that banks in less developed nations will have the
most difficulty meeting the new standards. 222 It is foreseeable
that regulators from wealthier countries could use the Minimum
Standards as a weapon against poorer nations that have weak
financial regulatory systems. They could restrict the establish-
ment of branches Of their home-country banks in these poorer
nations, rather than using the Minimum Standards as construc-
tive tools to improve financial regulation worldwide. While the
members of the Basle Committee may have a general concern
about Third World banks operating in industrialized nations
after their experience with BCCI,22 3 they did not intend to limit
the expansion of Third World banks. 224 By issuing these stan-
dards, the Committee intended to respond to the failure of a $20
billion international bank, not to limit the growth of Third World
banks generally.
4. Lack of Any New Substantive Standards
Some analysts believe that the new standards are merely sym-
bolic and will have no appreciable effect on international banking
220. Makin, supra note 120, at 97.
221. Id.
222. McNeil, supra note 210, at 2. The United Nations Center on Transnational Cor-
porations also issued a report in light of the closure of BCCI. UNrrED NATIONS CENTRE
ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, NEW ISSUES FOR TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION IN
TRANSNATIONAL BANKING (1992) [hereinafter U.N. REPORT] (on file with The George Wash-
ington Journal of International Law and Economics). See also Steve Lohr, U.N. Study Assails the
Way B.C.C.I. Was Shut by Western Central Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at D7. The
report noted the massive losses caused by the bank's closure and pointed out that the
economic damage fell hardest on countries such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, where
BCCI was an important institution. U.N. REPORT, supra, at 13-14; Lohr, supra, at D7.
223. Pakistani business executives founded BCCI in 1972. Mattingly Statement, supra
note 119, at 905.
224. Cf BIS Panel Lines Up Plans to Prevent New BCCI's, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR BANK
LETrER, June 29, 1992, at 1, 9 (stating that the intent of Basle Committee is to head off
any future BCCI-type failures).
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practice. 225 The standards themselves offer little new substance.
One international banking scholar has commented that the Mini-
mum Standards simply reiterate what was agreed upon in the
Revised Concordat. 226 The main effect of the new standards, if
any, may be an increase in the amount of information flowing
between banks and regulators and among regulators in different
countries.
VI. OTHER REGULATORY RESPONSES TO BCCI
Other legislative bodies are also responding to the failure of
BCCI. The U.S. Congress, in response to both the BCCI and the
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro scandals, passed the Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991.227 As part of its 1992
program, the European Community (EC) has adopted a directive
on consolidated supervision of financial institutions. 228
A. European Community Response
With the implementation of the 1992 EC program, European
nations are placing more emphasis on supervisory standards and
bank regulation, the goal being the eventual mutual convergence
of banking regulation in the EC.229 To meet this goal, the EC has
passed several directives, the most important of which is the Sec-
ond Banking Directive. 230 Under the Second Banking Directive,
a bank licensed in a Member State will be able to open a branch
225. E.g., International Banking Authorities Set Post-BCCI Standards, Japan Economic
Newswire, July 7, 1992 (quoting Alicia Ogawa of S.G. Warburg Securities (Japan), Inc.),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
226. E.g., Maggie Fox, Promises and Problems in New Basel Rules, AM. BANKER, July 8,
1992, at 6 (quoting Richard Dale). For instance, the Revised Concordat also discussed
the principle of consolidated supervision. REVISED CONCORDAT, supra note 43, at 905.
227. FBSEA, supra note 6.
228. Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institu-
tions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 O.J. (L 110) 52.
229. See ROB DIXON, BANKING IN EUROPE: THE SINGLE MARKET 55-56 (1991).
230. Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination of
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit
of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 1989 O.J. (L 386)
1 [hereinafter Second Banking Directive]. The others are Council Directive 91/308 of
10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for Purposes of Money
Laundering, 1991 OJ. (L 166) 77; Council Directive 89/647 of 18 December 1989 on a
Solvency Ratio for Credit Institutions, 1989 OJ. (L 386) 14; Council Directive 89/299
of 17 April 1989 on the Own Funds of Credit Institution, 1989 Oj. (L 124) 16; and
Council Directive 83/350 of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a
Consolidated Basis, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18, superseded by Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April
1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 OJ. (L
110) 52.
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without restriction in any other member state.23' Any activity
that a Member State authorizes a bank to perform in that Mem-
ber State can also be performed by the bank in any other Mem-
ber State.232 A host Member State may not require additional
licensing or authorization for a bank that already is authorized or
licensed in another Member State. 233 In effect, the Second Bank-
ing Directive provides for the granting of a single license to a
bank of a Member State which will be recognized throughout the
EC. 234 The stability of the European banking system under this
"single passport" scheme thus depends upon adequate supervi-
sion of banks in their respective parent jurisdictions.2 35
In order to ensure adequate supervision in all member nations,
on April 6, 1992 the EC Council of Ministers adopted a new
Directive on Consolidated Supervision 23 6 that supplanted the
previous 1983 Directive. 237 The new directive has four aims: (1)
231. Second Banking Directive, supra note 230, art. 18, Annex at 9-10, 13. Under
this directive, foreign bank establishments may be entitled to engage in the following
activities in host-countries:
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.
2. Lending.
3. Financial leasing.
4. Money transmission services.
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g. credit cards, travellers'
cheques and bankers' drafts).
6. Guarantees and commitments.
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in:
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, etc.);
(b) foreign exchange;
(c) financial futures and options;
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments;
(e) transferable securities.
8. Participation in share issues and the provision of services related to such
issues.
9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related
questions, and advice and services relating to mergers and the purchase of
undertakings.
10. Money broking [sic].
11. Portofolio [sic] management and advice.
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities.
13. Credit reference services.
14. Safe custody services.
Id. Annex, at 13.
232. Id. art. 18, para. 1, at 9.
233. Id. art. 6, para. 1, at 4.
234. See id.
235. Hall, supra note 118, at 10.
236. Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institu-
tions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 O.J. (L 110) 52. Member States were required to
promulgate enabling legislation for this directive by January 1, 1993. Id. art. 9, para. 1,
at 58.
237. Council Directive 83/350 of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Institu-
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to extend consolidated supervision to more types of banking
structures; (2) to require non-bank companies of a mixed activity
holding company to provide necessary information to regulators
who are responsible for the supervision of banks; (3) to specify
areas covered by consolidated supervision; and (4) to specify
consolidation methods.238
In a significant change, the directive applies to an entire bank
holding company, not merely the bank itself,239 and applies to
banking groups whether or not the parent company is a credit
institution. 240 By contrast, the 1983 Directive applied only to
banking groups of which the parent company was a credit institu-
tion.24' Thus, while the 1983 Directive did not apply to BCCI
because its parent holding company was not a bank, the new
directive applies to BCCI-type corporate structures-non-bank
holding companies with banking subsidiaries. 242 Under the new
directive, bank regulators must apply EC banking standards (cap-
ital requirements, credit limits to customers, solvency ratios) to
consolidated banking groups.243
The new Directive on Consolidated Supervision also allocates
regulatory responsibility among bank supervisors, in a manner
similar to that of the Minimum Standards. The primary regulator
of any EC bank is the regulator in the Member State in which the
parent credit institution is authorized or licensed. 244 Where the
bank is held by a financial holding company, however, the Mem-
ber State that licensed or authorized the banking subsidiary has
primary regulatory responsibility.245 Where a financial holding
company has banking establishments in two or more Member
States, three allocations of regulatory responsibility are possible:
(1) the Member State in which the holding company is licensed
or authorized has primary responsibility if it also has licensed or
tions on a Consolidated Basis, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18. For replacement language, see
Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a
Consolidated Basis, 1992 Oj. (L 110) 52, 53. See BCCI Lesson Spurs EC Ministers to Adopt
Consolidated Supervision Plan, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA), at 663 (Apr. 13, 1992).
238. See Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Insti-
tutions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 O.J. (L 110) 52, 53.
239. See id. arts. 2-3, at 54-55.
240. See id.
241. See Council Directive 83/350 of 13June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Insti-
tutions on a Consolidated Basis, arts. 2-3, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18, 18-19.
242. See Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Insti-
tutions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 O.J. (L 110) 52.
243. See id. art. 3, para. 5, at 54.
244. Id. art. 4, para. 1, at 55.
245. Id. art. 4, para. 2, at 55.
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authorized a banking establishment of that company; (2) if not,
all of the Member states "concerned" (including the. one that
licensed the holding company) must reach agreement as to who
has primary responsibility; or (3) if the concerned Member States
cannot reach agreement, as a default, primary authority must rest
with the Member State that has authorized the banking establish-
ment with the "greatest balance sheet total." 246
The new directive does apply, in a limited fashion, to "mixed-
activity" companies-those that provide both banking and non-
banking services (e.g., insurance).247, Under the new directive,
Member States must insure that mixed-activity companies supply
bank regulators with "any information which would be relevant
for the purposes of supervising the credit institution subsidiar-
ies" as well as guarantee that -appropriate inspectors are able to
carry out on-the-spot verification inspections 'of mixed-activity
companies. 2 48 Furthermore, Member States generally shall facili-
tate the exchange of information between regulators2 49 and shall
allow regulators to verify the information provided. 250
Finally, the directive authorizes the EC Commission to petition
the Council to enter into agreements with non-member states
concerning consolidated supervision of foreign banks. 25' Thus,
the EC as a whole could negotiate with the United States to
develop a regulatory plan for a bank and, at least, would be able
to negotiate an information-exchange agreement.
It is interesting to note that the Minimum Standards may con-
flict with the European Community's Second Banking Directive,
which expressly prohibits discrimination against banks of Mem-
ber States. 252 The Minimum Standards allow a host regulator to
prevent the operation of a foreign banking establishment if the
host regulator is not satisfied with the supervision provided by
the home regulator of the foreign bank. 253 While the Minimum
Standards encourage host regulators to discriminate more finely
among home regulators, the Second Directive prohibits this type
of discrimination. 254 One solution may be for bank regulators to
246. Id.
247. Id. art. 2, at 54.
248. Id. art. 6, at 56.
249. See id. art. 7, paras. 2-4, at 56-57.
250. See, e.g., id. art. 6, para. 2, at 56.
251. Id. art. 8, paras. 1-2, at 57.
252. Second Banking Directive, supra note 230, art. 14, para. 2, at 7-8.
253. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 6-7.
254. Second Banking Directive, supra note 230, art. 14, para. 2, at 7-8.
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treat the European Community as one jurisdiction.
The forced closure of BCCI also generated discussion regard-
ing possible changes in other EC laws. Sir Leon Brittan, formerly
the EC's Financial Services Commissioner and currently the EC's
Trade Commissioner, has considered amending the draft
Deposit Guarantee Directive to include a requirement that a
nation that registers a bank is also responsible for the protection
of all depositors of that bank even if the deposits are located in a
foreign nation. 255 Another of Sir Brittan's proposals would out-
law certain banking structures that are specifically designed to
avoid effective consolidated supervision.256
Eventually, the European Central Bank, proposed in the
Treaty of Maastricht, 25 7 may oversee the regulation of European
banks to a certain extent. 258  The European Central Bank may
have some supervisory responsibilities over the foreign opera-
tions of European banks, but national regulators will retain sig-
nificant regulatory power.259 With the ultimate approval of the
Treaty of Maastricht in doubt, however, the future of European
bank regulation and of the allocation of supervisory responsibil-
ity is not clear.260
B. U.S. Response
The U.S. Congress, like the EC, passed legislation in response
255. Max Hall, The BCCI Affair, BANKING WORLD, Oct. 1991, at 11, 12-13.
256. See id. at 13.
257. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [TREATY OF MAASTRICHT], Feb. 7, 1992 art. G(7)
(amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community). The future of
the Treaty is in question following a plebiscite that rejected the Maastricht Treaty in
Denmark. See Why the Danes Wouldn't, THE ECONOMIST, June 6, 1992, at 52. Plebiscites in
France and Ireland have been in favor of the Treaty. See A Vote Too Far, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 26, 1992, at 48 (France); Maastricht at a Glance, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1992, at
60 (Ireland). The Treaty faces a great deal of opposition in Britain. Germany Ratifies
Europe Unity Pacts, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1992, at 19. See generally An Idea That is Sinking
Fast, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1992, at 47 (summarizing hindrances to the ratification
of the Treaty).
258. TREATY OF MAASTRICHT, supra note 257, ch. 2, art. 105, paras. 5-6 (stating that
the European System of Central Banks shall "contribute to the smooth conduct of poli-
cies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions" and that the European Central Bank may be given "specific tasks
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other
financial institutions").
259. See id.
260. Spain Ratifies Maastricht Treaty, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 721, at 10 (Dec.
10, 1992). As of March 29, 1993, ten member countries of the EC had ratified the
Treaty of Maastricht. Balladur and Mitterrand Agree on Importance of Europe, EUR. REP., Mar.
31, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURRNT File.
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to the failure of BCCI. The FRB studied and proposed tougher
regulatory laws based upon its experience dealing with BCCI. 261
In December 1991, Congress passed the Foreign Bank Supervi-
sion Enhancement Act of 1991 (FBSEA)262 as part of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.263
Prior to passage of the FBSEA, individual state banking regula-
tors supervised most foreign banks in the United States.
264
Under the FBSEA, the FRB now must approve the opening of all
foreign banking establishments-branches, agencies, and repre-
sentative offices. 265 Thus, the FBSEA creates a federal overlay of
regulation of foreign banks. The FBSEA is designed to keep
poorly managed, poorly capitalized or inadequately supervised
banking institutions from operating in the United States.
266
In order to obtain FRB approval, a foreign bank wishing to
open an establishment in the United States must show that it is
subject to "comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consol-
idated basis" by its home regulator.267 If it wishes to establish a
branch or agency in the United States, the foreign bank also must
make adequate assurances that it will provide the FRB whatever
information the FRB deems necessary for its supervision of the
foreign bank.2 68 The FRB thus will be concerned about other
nations' bank secrecy laws that may prevent it from obtaining suf-
ficient information on the parent bank.269 This new approval
261. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119; see also Federal Reserve System, Statement by
E. Gerald Corrigan, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Before the Committee on Banking,
Finance, and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, September 13, 1991, 77 FED. REs.
BULL. 918, 919 (1991) (advocating passage of tougher legislation).
262. FBSEA, supra note 6. See generally Ann E. Misback, The Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 1 (1993).
263. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). On January 28,
1993, the Federal Reserve Board issued final rules revising Regulation Y and Regulation
K in response to the FBSEA. 58 Fed. Reg. 6348 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 211, 225, 263, 265). Earlier, on January 6, 1993, the Federal Reserve Board issued
regulations in response to changes in the Bank Holding Company Act resulting from the
FBSEA. 58 Fed. Reg. 471 (1993) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225).
264. Gerth, supra note 156, at A13. See also supra text accompanying note 16.
265. FBSEA, supra note 6, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3105(d)(1), 3107(a)(1) (Supp. III
1992). FRB approval for representative offices is a significant change from prior law. See
H.R. REP. No. 330, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1901, 1941.
266. Mattingly Statement, supra note 119, at 917. This is an attempt to prevent estab-
lishments that might engage in BCCI-type illegal activities from entering the U.S. mar-
ket. See id.
267. FBSEA, supra note 6, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3105(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1992).
268. Id. § 3105(d)(3)(C).
269. See BIS Panel Lines Up Plans to Prevent New BCCIs, supra note 224, at 9.
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process is. likely: to be slow and require the exchange of large
amounts of information. 70
In addition to expanding the FRB's power to approve foreign
banking establishments, the FBSEA also grants it the authority to
terminate foreign bank operations in the United States. The FRB
may terminate a foreign bank's authority to operate if the bank is
not subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated
basis; if the FRB has "reasonable cause to believe" that the for-
eign bank has violated a law; or if the bank has engaged in
unsound or unsafe banking practices.2 7'
Under the FBSEA, the FRB has the authority to examine a for-
eign bank even if it is licensed by a state,272 and it must make at
least one examination of each branch or agency every year.273
The FBSEA as originally enacted requires foreign banks to cre-
ate at least one separate U.S. 'subsidiary if the bank accepts
deposits in amounts less than $100,000.274 A separate subsidiary
allows for easier compensation to depositors in case of a bank
failure; this structure facilitates the enforcement of court orders
(such as discovery or attachment orders) by avoiding complicated
extraterritoriality issues that would be present if a foreign branch
were involved. On the other hand, the subsidiary structure limits
270. See id.
271. FBSEA, supra note 6, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e)(1) (Supp. II 1992). This
authority applies only to U.S. branches and agencies. Representative offices may be
closed by the FRB based upon the criteria discussed supra at text accompanying notes
265, 267. Id. § 3107(b).
272. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 3105(b)(1) (1988) (requiring FRB to defer to state authori-
ties in examining foreign banks) with 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1992) (con-
taining no such language with relation to FRB examinations). See H.R. REP. No. 330,
supra note 265, at 127, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1940 (noting the removal of this
language); see also Thomas E. Crocker, Foreign Banks in the US: A Political Power Struggle,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1992, at 24, 25 (stating that this language marks a shift in the
dual monitoring system of foreign banks in the United States).
273. FBSEA, supra note 6, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1992).
The FRB is given discretion as to whether and when it examines representative offices.
See id. § 3107(c).
274. Id. § 3104(c)(1) (Supp. III 1992). There is a grandfather clause that exempts
from this provision any foreign branch that was an "insured branch" on December 19,
1991. Id. § 3104(c)(2). See generally Barbara C. Matthews, Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act; Implications for Foreign and Domestic Banks, 58 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23,
at 1001, 1005-10 (June 8, 1992) (discussing subsidiary and insurance expansion require-
ments in the FBSEA).
In drafting the law, Congress obviously meant banks which accept retail deposits, but
the statute does not qualify the type of deposits. A technical amendment was passed in
October 1992 to correct this ambiguity. Housing and Community Development Act of
1992 Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1604(a)(1 1), 106 Stat. 3672, 4083 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 3104).
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the amount of lending legally permissible by the foreign bank
subsidiary. Because a subsidiary is capitalized separately from
the parent bank, the subsidiary, unlike a branch, cannot rely on
the assets and capital of the parent to support its lending. 275
The FBSEA makes significant changes in the regulation of for-
eign banks in the United States. The FRB is now the clear pri-
mary regulator of foreign banks in the United States. Under this
statute, the dual system of banking regulation is no longer appli-
cable to foreign banks. A state banking license is no longer suffi-
cient to operate in the United States; a foreign bank must also
obtain the prior approval of the FRB in order to open any U.S.
establishment. The FBSEA also erodes the unconditional
national treatment approach previously adopted by Congress in
the International Banking Act of 1978.276 While U.S.-chartered
banks can operate with either state or fed eral :approyval, 277 a for-
eign bank must obtain FRB approval before it can operate an
establishment in the United States. Foreign banks thus are sub-
ject to an additional layer of federal supervision that domestic
banks can avoid. The new act is designed to prevent another
exploitation of uncoordinated supervision, similar to the fraud
perpetrated by BCCI's managers.
C. Other Proposals for Changes in International Bank Regulation
1. British Parliamentary Recommendations
The Treasury and Civil Service Committee of the House of
Commons of the British Parliament issued a report on March 4,
1992, before the new Minimum Standards were released, entitled
"Banking Supervision and BCCI: International and National
Regulation." 278 The Committee in its report made several rec-
ommendations for changes in banking law. The Committee sug-
gested that bank auditors should have a legal duty to report
suspicious activity to regulators. 279 The Committee also sug-
gested that the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) should
supervise the standards employed by the domestic regulators of
275. See Wolfram & Whitener, supra note 25, at 24.
276. Crocker, supra note 272, at 24, 25. See supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
277. See supra note 31.
278. HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE, BANKING SUPER-
VISION AND BCCI: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL REGULATION, FOURTH REPORT, H.C.
Doc. No. 177, House of Commons Sess. 1991-92 (1992) [hereinafter COMMONS COMMIT-
TEE REPORT].
279. Id. paras. 20-21, at xxx.
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international banks.280 The Committee felt that the BIS, well
versed in international bank regulation, could expand its role in
that area relatively easily and that other international regulatory
bodies (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)) were less suited
for this role.2 8 ' The report also recommended that the Bank of
England study whether foreign banks should be required to
incorporate in Great Britain if they wished to operate there.282
While the Committee did not recommend the creation of a
new international regulatory agency, it did conclude that a col-
lege of regulators, like the one used to oversee BCCI in the late
1980s, was not effective and could not replace a lead regulator
who could be held accountable and thus would be likely to regu-
late the bank more stringently. 283 The report also recommended
that the Revised Concordat become a legally enforceable docu-
ment28 4 and that a revision of the Revised Concordat be drafted
to ensure that every international bank has a lead regulator. 285
In assessing the performance of the parties in handling the
BCCI affair, the Parliament report had relatively few complaints
about Price Waterhouse, BCCI's auditors,28 6 but criticized bank
regulators in both Great Britain and Luxembourg. The regula-
tors in Britain and Luxembourg had known of irregularities at
BCCI since the 1970s, yet took no action. British regulators
refused to take over the supervision of BCCI when Luxembourg
admitted it lacked the necessary capabilities.2 87 According to the
report, the British and Luxembourg regulators should have
forced a change in the corporate structure of BCCI in order to
ensure that BCCI had a capable lead regulator.28 The regula-
tors made these efforts shortly before the bank's closure, but they
clearly waited too long to act.2 89
2. British Regulators' Recommendations
British regulators responded to criticism of their regulation of
280. Id. para. 19, at xxx; see supra note 1 (addressing the BIS).
281. COMMONS COMMIITEE REPORT, supra note 278, para 19, at xxx.
282. Id. para. 89, at xxviii; see id. para. 23, at xxxi.
283. Id. para. 49, at xx.
284. Id. para. 44, at xviii-xix. The Committee did note the difficulty of implementing
such a change and the decrease in regulatory flexibility that would result therefrom. Id.
285. Id. para. 49, at xx.
286. See id. paras. 22-26, at xii-xiii.
287. See id. paras. 7-8, 37-40, at viii, xvii-xviii.
288. Id. para. 13, at xxix; see id. para. 12, at x.
289. See id. paras. 26-33, at xiii-xvi.
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BCCI in a report issued by the Bank of England on July 8,
1992.290 The Bank of England requested legislative changes that
would grant it additional authority to respond to future financial
disruptions such as the BCCI affair. First, it requested the power
to refuse or revoke the authorization of a bank if the bank's cor-
porate structure prevented effective supervision.29' The Bank
also wanted to ensure that all foreign banks were subject to effec-
tive home supervision on a consolidated basis. 292 The Bank
noted the benefits of prohibiting a bank from operating in the
United Kingdom if its home regulator did not follow the new
Minimum Standards, but also acknowledged the difficulties
inherent in assessing compliance with the standards. 293 The
Bank requested the power to withdraw the authorization of a
bank operating a branch in a jurisdiction whose supervision was
lax. 294 In addition, the Bank called for close cooperation among
international regulators 295 and for reconsideration of codifying a
requirement that bank auditors inform regulators of fraud.296
Auditors in the United Kingdom currently have the authority, but
not the duty, to inform regulators of fraud.2 97
3. Group of Thirty's Recommendations
Before the closure of BCCI, the Group of Thirty, a private
research and advisory group based in Washington, D.C., pre-
pared a report suggesting changes in international bank regula-
tion.298 In the report the Group stated the goals of bank
regulation: maintaining competitiveness among financial institu-
tions; ensuring the safety and soundness of the financial system;
ensuring the safety of deposits; protecting against systemic risk
that prudential controls may be ineffective to prevent; ensuring
290. BANK OF ENGLAND, TREASURY AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE, BANKING SUPERVI-
SION AND BCCI: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL REGULATION; FOURTH REPORT; BANK OF
ENGLAND RESPONSE (1992) [hereinafter BANK OF ENGLAND RESPONSE] (on file with The
George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
291. Id. paras. 10-13.
292. See id. para. 14.
293. See id. paras. 16-20.
294. See id. para. 13.
295. Id. para. 20.
296. See id. paras. 34-36.
297. See Banking Act, 1987, ch. 22, § 47, 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND
WALES 527, 581 (4th ed., 1987) (stating only that it is not a breach of an auditor's duty of
confidentiality to the bank to report such fraud to the Bank of England).
298. SYDNEY J. KEY & HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES: A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (Group of Thirty Occasional Papers No. 35, 1991) (on file with
The George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics).
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adequate consumer protection; and maintaining effective mone-
tary policy.299 The report laid out a framework of international
bank regulation that takes cognizance of both the regulatory
objectives being sought and the mode of providing banking serv-
ices being used (a branch, a subsidiary or merely selling across
borders) .300
The report principally addressed the allocation of supervisory
responsibility between host and home regulators3 0' and sug-
gested that host laws should apply to the local subsidiaries of for-
eign banks. 30 2 When a bank offers services across borders
without operating an establishment in a foreign jurisdiction,
however, the law of the home country should govern. 30 3 The
Group recommended that a set of harmonized, rules govern the
operation of the branches of foreign banks.30 4  Finally, the
Group of Thirty recommended granting to an international insti-
tution such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), GATT or BIS the power to formulate
rules governing international banking; to monitor the implemen-
tation of those rules; and to resolve disputes.30 5
4. Other Recommendations
a. Increased regulator liability
Regardless of the changes and recommendations made by the
Basle Committee and commentators, domestic bank regulators
will continue to play a significant role in the supervision of inter-
national banks. Domestic regulators, however, need an incentive
to enforce the Minimum Standards as written and not to ignore
or circumvent them in order to increase their nation's share of
the international banking market. For this reason, Sir Leon Brit-
tan has suggested that the home country, through its deposit
insurance program, should be responsible for the losses of a for-
eign branch of a bank incorporated in the home country.
30 6 If
299. Id. at 8-15.
300. Id. at 4-6; see also Home Thoughts from Abroad, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1991, at
74.
301. See KEY & Scorr, supra note 298, at 15-33.
302. Id. at 29-33. The paper also stresses the use of "harmonized rules"--those
rules that apply in both the host- and home-countries-in relation to foreign subsidiar-
ies. Id. at 29-33.
303. Id. at 16-19. Harmonization is less necessary here. See id.
304. Id. at 19-29. The report notes that enforcement and deposit insurance still
would have to be provided by the home country. Id.
305. Id. at 37-43.
306. Leon Brittan, Lesson of BCClIfor the Regulators, FIN. TIMES, July 29, 1991, at 11.
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adopted, this proposal would give regulators a strong economic
incentive to supervise effectively the global operations of a bank
headquartered within their jurisdiction. 30 7 Bank regulators so far
have rejected this notion.308
b. Supranational Regulation
Some commentators argue that a new supranational regulatory
body, having the power to enforce its own standards and mete
out sanctions, is needed to supervise international banks. 09 The
Basle Committee and BIS are mentioned as institutions that
could fill this role.310 Both entities would require additional full-
time personnel who could deal with these issues on a regular
basis and resolve technical questions.3 1' On the other hand, the
Basle Committee and BIS may not be effective in this area, since
their membership is comprised solely of industrialized nations.
Banks headquartered in Third World nations that are not mem-
bers would escape this more stringent comprehensive
supervision 31 2
Other analysts see no need for a new international bank regu-
lator. Some European Community officials argue that a single
world-wide regulator would not be practical in handling a major
international bank failure313 and that a new international bureau-
cracy would be slow to respond to a problem. Furthermore, the
effectiveness of a new international agency might suffer from a
lack of broad support among national regulators.3 1 4
307. See, e.g., Makin, supra note 120, at 96 (quoting disgruntled British banker forced
to make good on losses of sterling deposits in the aftermath of the BCCI scandal).
308. See, e.g., id.
309. E.g., Connie M. Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending:
Part 11, 20 Irr'L LAw. 153, 215 (1986). Friesen acknowledges the obstacles that current
principles of international law and national sovereignty present to this idea. Id. See also
supra text accompanying note 305 (regarding Group of Thirty's suggestion of having an
international body set and implement standards).
310. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 309.
311. See Gary N. Kleiman, Much Criticized Basel Banking Group Comes Under Siege from
Member Countries, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REG., Feb. 3, 1992 (discussing need for
expanded Basle Committee permanent staff), available in LEXIS, Banks Library,
ALLBNK File.
312. While GATT or the IMF may be more appropriate entities, they lack expertise
in bank regulation.
313. Paolo Clarotti, EC's Financial Regulations Should Stand the Test of Worldwide BCCI
Scandal, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REG., Jan. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Banks
Library, ALLBNK File. Clarotti works in the Directorate General For Financial Institu-
tions at the EC Commission in Brussels.
314. See Makin, supra note 120, at 96, 97 (raising issue of proprietary attitudes toward
regulatory jurisdiction as well as issue of cost). Both the Group of Thirty and L. William
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There also would be pragmatic difficulties with such an
approach. Decisions in the Basle Committee are reached by con-
sensus. Such an institution, operating slowly and conservatively,
would not be effective as an international bank regulator; formu-
lating a quick response to a crisis would be difficult (if not impos-
sible) where unanimity was required. The college of regulators
that supervised BCCI for several years illustrates the weaknesses
of regulation by consensus. 315 Furthermore, banking laws and
the safety and soundness of a nation's financial institutions are
closely tied to national security and sovereignty. Nations would
be very reluctant to relinquish this supervisory power to an inter-
national agency.31 6 The new Minimum Standards issued by the
Basle Committee do not create a new international regulatory
body and do not hint at the creation of one in the near future.
c. A compromise on supranational regulation
Improved cooperation and the exchange of information
among national regulators would create a more potent regula-
tory regime. In the absence of one international bank regulator,
domestic regulators who are more familiar with the global health
of their local institutions would be in a better position to regulate
those institutions. Furthermore, not being able to shift responsi-
bility for a bank failure to an international supervisor would give
them greater incentive to regulate effectively.
Through its laws on financial institutions, particularly the new
Directive on Consolidated Supervision,3 17 the European Com-
munity is developing this type of regime. Domestic regulators
still have primary responsibility for the safety and soundness of
institutions incorporated in their country, but are required to
exchange information with regulators in other Member States.3 18
No EC bank regulator has been created yet.
The size of the BCCI failure highlights the potential danger of
Seidman, former head of the FDIC, support this new agency. Id. at 97. See supra text
accompanying note 305.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 163-165.
316. Denmark's plebiscite rejecting the Treaty of Maastricht and the intense debate
in France that preceded the referendum that very narrowly approved the treaty on Sep-
tember 20, 1992, see supra note 257, illustrate the reluctance of an electorate to relin-
quish a portion of national sovereignty to an international body (in this case European
Community institutions).
317. Council Directive 92/30 of 6 April 1992 on the Supervision of Credit Institu-
tions on a Consolidated Basis, 1992 OJ. (L 110) 52.
318. See id. art. 4, paras. 1-2, at 55; see also id. arts. 6-7, at 56-57. See generally supra text
accompanying notes 236-251.
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an international bank failure and the need for changes in interna-
tional bank regulation. 3' 9 A system that allows a $20 billion bank
to grow while committing massive fraud is clearly in need of
change. Although the coordinated closure of BCCI in this case
prevented a massive disruption of the financial system, the
absence of clear lender of last resort responsibility and a lack of
coordination among regulators in the future could threaten the
integrity of payments and settlements systems throughout the
world.320 For example, without a coordinated closure of BCCI,
the U.S. settlements system could have been threatened because
BCCI held assets and deposits in U.S. dollars.3 2'
The international bank regulatory system must address the
issue of offshore financial centers with lax regulation and strict
bank secrecy laws. BCCI took advantage of the lax regulatory
environment in the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg in order to
perpetrate fraud. The Basle Committee's Minimum Standards,
issued in July 1992, undoubtedly are not the final resolution of
this issue. 322
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The closure of BCCI revealed that while the banking industry
has expanded and developed, world-wide bank regulation has
not. These new realities demand that international bank regula-
tion be updated. The Basle Committee has attempted to meet
the new realities by promulgating the Minimum Standards, but in
the final analysis the new standards do not make any dramatic
changes in bank regulation and contain flaws.
First, the Minimum Standards assert as a fundamental princi-
ple that the parent (or home) regulator should have primary
responsibility for the supervision of the foreign operations of an
international bank. The new standards directly state that a bank
should have a single regulator for all of its global operations. At
319. For example, BCCI had no lender of last resort. Assuring that each interna-
tional bank in the world had a lender of last resort could bring greater security to the
banking system.
320. Dale, supra note 156.
321. Id. Without a relatively organized closing of BCCI, banks would be unable to
settle transactions with other banks because BCCI could not make its payments. If the
resulting shortfall of funds was significant, the lender of last resort would have to pro-
vide sufficient liquidity to allow transactions to settle.
322. Indeed, a meeting of over 100 bank regulators to discuss the standards was held
in October 1992 in France. Michael Rowe, Proposed Oversight Standards Are Welcomed
Worldwide, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REG., Oct. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Banks
Library, ALLBNK File.
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the same time, however, the standards carve out a generous
exception undercutting this general single regulator principle:
a host supervisor may allow a local branch or subsidiary of a
foreign bank to operate in its jurisdiction even though the home
regulator is not providing adequate supervision of the foreign
bank.3 23 While the host supervisor should impose restrictive
measures on the establishment in this situation, the language of
the standards does not make this imposition an absolute require-
ment.324 Furthermore, under the new standards the supervision
of subsidiaries is left as a joint responsibility between the host and
home regulators. This division of responsibility leaves open
the opportunity for miscommunication and inadequate
supervision. 325
Second, it is acknowledged that a lead regulator should super-
vise a bank on a consolidated basis. In the case of BCCI there
was no clear lead regulator, and no regulator supervised the
overall bank on a consolidated basis. As a result, BCCI senior
managers were able to conceal their fraudulent transactions
for several years. On this point the Minimum Standards are
adequate.3 26
Third, in order for the new standards to be effective, all juris-
dictions need to enforce them. Yet only a small minority of the
world's banking regulators have pledged to abide by them. To
enforce the new regulatory system created by the Minimum Stan-
dards, members of the Basle Committee must have the fortitude
to lock out banks with offices in jurisdictions that do not abide by
the new Minimum Standards and prevent their own banks from
opening offices in those lax jurisdictions.
International bank regulators need to avoid a "race to the bot-
tom," that is, the weakening of their own financial regulatory sys-
tem in order to attract additional foreign capital. In a
multijurisdictional regulatory regime, a tendency for competitive
deregulation exists.3 2 7 Conscientious regulators are faced with a
dilemma. If they impose too much regulation relative to other
nations, they become less competitive and the amount of foreign
investment decreases. On the other hand, if the regulation in a
local jurisdiction is lax and banks in that jurisdiction have signifi-
323. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 6-7.
324. See id. at 7.
325. See id. at 2-3.
326. See id. at 3-4.
327. DALE, supra note 37, at 172.
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cant financial dealings with other banks, then systemic risk
increases and is shared by all nations, not only by the nations
with lax bank regulation.3 28 As long as regulatory disparities
exist, so will competitive inequalities.
3 2 9
In order to discourage this tendency to "race to the bottom,"
therefore, any new regulatory regime must attack the causes that
lead to a lax regulatory environment: national autonomy, neu-
trality, and parent responsibility.330 To counter the influence of
national autonomy, regulators should harmonize banking regula-
tions, which they are attempting to do through the new Minimum
Standards. The Basle Committee has articulated the type and
degree of supervision that is minimally acceptable. To reverse
neutrality, regulators should make each foreign bank subject to
the parent bank's domestic regulations, although this may create
competitive disadvantages within a single jurisdiction.33  The
foreign bank may be limited in its activities not because of the
host regulator's rules but rather because some regulation of its
parent bank restricts the bank's activities in the host country. In
order to remove parental responsibility, the home regulator or
central bank should not have lender of last resort responsibility
for the foreign subsidiaries of an international bank.3 3 2 Making a
home regulator of a bank the lender of last resort for that bank
tends to encourage host nations to be more lax in regulation of
foreign banks.333 Lender of last resort responsibility in the inter-
national context has the tendency to generate moral hazard and
cause foreign banks to behave imprudently. 334 A regulatory sys-
tem with the preceding characteristics may discourage lax inter-
national bank supervision.
As a result of the failure of BCCI, regulators are reaching a
consensus that international banks require more specific rules in
328. Kapstein, supra note 37, at 327; see also James W. Dean, Conservative versus Liberal
Regulation of International Banking, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 7 (1989) (setting forth and
explaining consumer-based reasons for this dilemma).
329. Usually this dilemma is resolved at a time when regulators are attempting to
respond to a large bank failure (and to prevent future failures), when solutions are not
apt to be thoughtful. Since 1974, cooperation among international banking regulators
and the harmonization of bank regulation has resulted only from successive financial
disruptions, not from a coordinated plan of changes agreed upon by regulators.
330. DALE, supra note 37, at 182.
331. Id. at 183. This is known as the "equity principle." Id.
332. Cf id. at 183 (suggesting the abolition of "the principle of parental responsibil-
ity by preventing risk transfers from foreign banking establishments to their parent
institutions").
333. See id. at 181.
334. Hess, supra note 33, at 184.
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order to operate safely and soundly. Broad principles, such as
those stated in the Concordat and the Revised Concordat, are no
longer sufficient in the complex world of global banking. The
Basle Committee has taken a step towards more stringent regula-
tion by turning these principles into minimum standards. The
new standards reinforce the principle of consolidated supervision
and state that the home regulator of an international bank should
be its primary regulator. 33 5 Still, further efforts by the Basle
Committee and international bank regulators are necessary to
achieve "global arrangements with the proper balance between
binding rules and discretionary powers." 336 International bank-
ing regulators need to agree on the meaning of common terms
and concepts in international bank regulation and then harmo-
nize domestic bank regulation even more than the new Minimum
Standards have done.
The EC directives on bank regulation 337 show promise in their
attempt to create the proper balance between harmonization of
banking law and local autonomy in implementing and interpret-
ing the law. The directives set substantive standards that each
member nation must follow, while leaving domestic bank regula-
tors significant power to regulate banks. Furthermore, these
directives encourage regulators to exchange information with
their foreign colleagues and to examine banks outside their juris-
diction if necessary. The requirement of one regulator supervis-
ing the entire bank, even when it operates in several countries,
necessitates the exchange of information about the bank. Simply
determining which regulator will take the lead role in supervising
a bank with operations in several countries requires cooperation
among national regulators.
In addition to exchanging information and engaging in day-to-
day supervision, regulators need to create an early warning sys-
tem for potential financial disruptions. The increased coopera-
tion among regulators contemplated by the Basle Committee
may help meet this goal. The aid of auditors who witness ques-
tionable banking practices would also improve early detection of
problem banks. Canadian law, for instance, allows auditors to
communicate their concerns directly to bank regulators and may
335. MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 3, at 3-4.
336. Leigh Bruce, BCCI: A Case for Global Banking Rules, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 26,
1991 (quoting Richard Dale).
337. See supra note 230.
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be a useful model for bank regulation in other nations. 3" 8
Finally, while no system of international bank regulation can
guarantee the prevention of deliberate fraud, international bank-
ing as it currently stands is weakly regulated. The Basle Commit-
tee's Minimum Standards are a step towards more stringent
regulation of international banks, but their effectiveness depends
on both the passage of national laws that accurately reflect the
standards' substantive provisions and the cooperation of domes-
tic regulators in enforcing these provisions. The effectiveness of
the new standards remains to be seen.
The harmonization of international bank regulation has moved
into a new stage of development, as national regulators attempt
to allocate supervisory responsibility among themselves and per-
haps to international entities. This evolution of bank regulation
is by no means complete. As banking becomes more global,
international bank regulation must develop and keep pace with
both the geographic expansion and the growing operational
complexity of international banks.
338. Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-1, § 242(l)-(4) (1985) (Can.) (requiring private auditors
to provide regulators with a copy of all reports they make to bank officials regarding
"any transactions or conditions affecting the well-being of the bank that . . . are not
satisfactory and require rectification"). Id. at § 242(3).
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